Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0714671314754f58…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

100.6 KB
MD5: 57537e8da671b1ef3c74edd48e5944ab SHA-1: 3caeabac845d542dd2903b96598f237bf7c63331 SHA-256: 0714671314754f5830bd40aba2f7f238796f18dc3c8dcd571ca4413e2ec2b124
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains critical heuristics indicating the exploitation of the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of OLE object data and automatic linking suggests an attempt to execute embedded content. This is a common method for delivering second-stage malware, likely downloaded via the embedded OLE object.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000013fd.bin
5aed3d7caafaa326d2bd53aafe6ec570ed558098d7ddf0fbbd4ba4e35e38106e
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x13FD 2107 bytes