Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 070d01146ba596fb…

MALICIOUS

PDF

88.1 KB Created: 2021-07-27 18:43:59 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-02
MD5: 819340057abdade021da3576549f60dd SHA-1: 067613cb24b3f658df8ddb5a35bb443d317c0053 SHA-256: 070d01146ba596fb7aa425fc8091a0015ea3c3e270dd23d7a82c332b9003ac6b
216 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains an embedded script that appears to be XMP metadata, but the heuristic firings indicate an embedded script payload. The document body text and embedded script metadata suggest a lure related to Windows 10 auto-login, likely to trick users into downloading and opening a malicious file. The presence of multiple links to compromised WordPress uploads and disposable hosting further supports a malicious intent to distribute malware.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9991

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream high PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain script execution markers such as ActiveXObject/CreateObject, WScript.Shell, PowerShell, or shell-exec primitives. This is stronger than ordinary PDF JavaScript because it indicates a staged external script payload hidden in stream bytes.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://xlux.vn/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/7qu19tas0hjv9nolm7olgnici3/3499495038.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://acetuitioncentre.com.au/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160891747d622f---58297592634.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pritchardreunion.com/clients/81409/File/juwirekarosepas.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://datong-travel.tw/upload/ckeditor/files/20210703140129.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://stsaischoolamritsar.com/slbdavbatala/userfiles/file/6746014713.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ardechetendancebrut.fr/userfiles/ardechetendancebrut.fr/file/34121005260.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.cargeacrew.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607f27ce9c7a9---rufawego.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://storage-in-motion.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607a4165726ca---89280067668.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ever-progress.com/upload/files/33397947797.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bitree.ru/ckfinder/userfiles/files/69167093683.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://icwest78.com/clients/67591/File/48562569356.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bhhangkhong.com/upload/images/files/wulexofebusibedusuk.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://paradisoseminatrici.it/userfiles/files/68800279932.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://alajuusa.eemedia/contents/file/nuwizigiburuzivomavagon.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://veglifekc.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files//31789219338.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://davidhammerstein.org/userfiles/file/77091713682.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://keralabiblesociety.com/fck_uploads/file/69204675856.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://smoothnomad.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/hpjtsoej28njb811vl7eu3rhca/tenatizasejet.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://carstenrath.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/nmcb16qier93ff34k4k7neui84/karapozipajedine.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://curewelldiabetes.com/userfiles/file/vitajole.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.idenet.net/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160780255063b6---72084993620.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bularz-auto.pl/images/userfiles/file/kusijozubotetu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://andreaslasnik.com/data/files/60287650537.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/S30rS-6n6vg/uplcv?utm_term=windows+10+auto+login+registry+powershellPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_pdf_script_00015b09.bin pdf-embedded-script PDF raw stream script payload at offset 0x15B09 1624 bytes
SHA-256: 8c57a261c0f3273fa889e60ca65c14fa2fc67c91b206e852eb38a712389b9f17
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 3 shell/COM execution token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
<?xpacket begin='' id='W5M0MpCehiHzreSzNTczkc9d'?>
<x:xmpmeta xmlns:x='adobe:ns:meta/' x:xmptk='PDF Studio'>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf='http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#'>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:dc='http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/'
  dc:format='application/pdf'>
  <dc:creator>
   <rdf:Seq>
    <rdf:li>Dahafe Govetiwu</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Seq>
  </dc:creator>
  <dc:description>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Windows 10 auto login registry powershell.    This article describes how to configure Windows 10 to automate the logon process. By using this f</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:description>
  <dc:subject>
   <rdf:Bag>
    <rdf:li>Windows 10 auto login registry powershell.    This article describes how to configure Windows 10 to automate the logon process. By using this f</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Bag>
  </dc:subject>
  <dc:title>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Windows 10 auto login registry powershell</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:title>
 </rdf:Description>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:pdf='http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/'
  pdf:Producer='PDF Studio'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmp='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/'
  xmp:CreateDate='2020-01-18T05:56:52'
  xmp:CreatorTool='PDF Studio'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpMM='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/'
  xmpMM:DocumentID='958279f7-6b8b-48b6-af94-8419eb1c57ce'
  xmpMM:InstanceID='149bc8c9-68c6-4c48-a01f-e5ecca7f3237'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpRights='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/'
  xmpRights:Marked='True'/>
</rdf:RDF>
</x:xmpmeta>
<?xpacket end='w'?>
font_00_sfnt_off0000f1d8.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF1D8 17564 bytes
SHA-256: 00bb84074bcfe7d3bf146ffb04bdb619c2ef46a94829864a8a1454c9e469d1dd
font_01_sfnt_off0001203f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1203F 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_02_sfnt_off00013856.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x13856 11136 bytes
SHA-256: 07ae1a3b6f02a7006012a895eb0fbde01468a6f520f0e97ff2b393ea903237d2

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.