Malicious Office (OOXML) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 06ece98e9271215b…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .XLSX

3.52 MB Created: 2013-03-07 11:20:43 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Excel 16.0300
MD5: d3d62038201b0d42795c2983d47aca33 SHA-1: bc1cf5e7443582a9ed0e15b07cf975ba3f2a90dd SHA-256: 06ece98e9271215b6b7a7eb7c13463569c980b12e45565d63ac7e93ce43371a8
230 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1137.003 Software Deployment Tools: WMI

The sample is an Excel macro-enabled workbook containing a Workbook_Open macro. This macro utilizes CreateObject to likely instantiate and execute an embedded OLE object, which is a common technique for downloading and running additional malicious content. The presence of a VBA project and the specific Workbook_Open auto-execution heuristic strongly suggest this malicious behavior.

Heuristics 9

  • OOXML part with non-standard content type and high-entropy data high OOXML_BOGUS_CUSTOM_PART
    The package declares a part with an invented content type (not an OpenXML/Office/standard media type) holding large, high-entropy (likely encrypted/packed) data. Legitimate OOXML files do not carry opaque binary blobs under custom content types; this is the embedded next-stage payload pattern used by loaders such as SVCReady.
  • Workbook_Open macro high OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • External relationship medium OOXML_EXTERNAL_REL
    External target in xl/externalLinks/_rels/externalLink1.xml.rels: https://ntsit-my.sharepoint.com/personal/danielle_white_nqa_com/Documents/Microsoft Teams Chat Files/NQA Contract Review
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Hidden worksheet (hidden) low OOXML_HIDDEN_SHEET
    Excel workbook contains 7 hidden sheet(s) — hidden sheets are commonly used to conceal macro code, staging data, or intermediate payload construction
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ntsit-my.sharepoint.com/personal/danielle_white_nqa_com/Documents/Microsoft

Extracted artifacts 6

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
c541ba0f8945613297780373f480be989d6dbf62370b04cbf9818a1b7bdc4204		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 10997 bytes
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
6a567a62cac695b89346c2d3760cef76d463b8fd53fc7d0a713771fa7c316ce7		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: xl/embeddings/Microsoft_Visio_2003-2010_Drawing.vsd 78848 bytes
ooxml_oleobject_01.bin
2d837cda5675e4f21349f7106c110a0cfa6fb63b2c606e4333551cab5105a6e9		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: xl/embeddings/Microsoft_Visio_2003-2010_Drawing1.vsd 113152 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
110b09db883b2fa4902d0769a720aa75885ef961324f96c3af9ae0308f64d050		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: xl/vbaProject.bin 41472 bytes
emf_00.emf
64c795f19b7a3c9f960065473438d98c426cdb1d30cc4b312bee03fdcf24a8da		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: xl/media/image3.emf 218732 bytes
emf_01.emf
f48a0ca025b9b7ef9e2c28888f80106e1b84ee0a84b027867142960a8e9e9b21		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: xl/media/image4.emf 54204 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.