Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 06e34c3a2e821f8d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

125.9 KB Created: 2020-08-14 03:11:46 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: b280c9c1b9632d3db84b2c80da21eca7 SHA-1: 8288a4c902cc64f4d6c9939de4e8bbf46a274121 SHA-256: 06e34c3a2e821f8d6738218a4a498c6be72947b52bbe2f8735818aa0132b7d6c
234 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains numerous links, including one pointing to a known malicious redirector, and heuristics indicate it's part of a link farm. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains text related to 'Chromium portable 32 bit' and a URL, suggesting a lure for users to install something. The presence of a password-protected archive lure and a browser installation lure further supports the social engineering aspect of this attack.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Browser extension / update installation lure high SE_BROWSER_INSTALL_LURE
    Document tells the user to install a browser extension, plugin, viewer, or browser update to view content — a common social-engineering path for credential theft and malware installation
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/pify?keyword=chromium+portable+32+bit
    • http://navip.wavesofchange.co.uk/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606490/xixowalifevuk.pdf
    • http://wejasus.victoriachampionart.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131871721/f2fafb.pdf
    • http://vopew.k9newlife.org/uploads/1/3/1/4/131482975/2969825.pdf
    • http://files.rhsglobalstudies.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070374/488361.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/9302/4151/files/xirupelaradapijefe.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/5942/0063/files/87970544418.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/4251/2802/files/batixapef.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/8011835234.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/2670/2758/files/sanogixekefitibowemugejod.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0436/5775/6825/files/puzagojabuwavi.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/0056/0803/files/dewufavifixuvupipu.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/3080/5671/files/ab_word_family_worksheets_for_kindergarten.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/2392/4376/files/32000006840.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/9755/5108/files/81057711034.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/8748/6358/files/89837258383.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/7391/2488/files/fejuwuk.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/9930/7678/files/mogemumuxurozif.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/0334/7098/files/35643864107.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/9199/2481/files/48572629736.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00018328.bin
294b0830b05e40a96488b6ec9cc8a37ab51139e384131b34f8963627f7d03b40
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x18328 5116 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0001948f.bin
2e346544948085efaecc3899ca577db0dcfe561a4f9b2271268c2352cbfae229
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1948F 15752 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0001c64c.bin
aad9bc0f36eadc3314e08670b59090120051e308b357201f134af3d0b781b2b0
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1C64C 16312 bytes
font_03_sfnt_off0001dbd8.bin
ff5f0ef16caf3e97cd1984b3a03ea88e11eab8cf63d2ee006085a4b9995833f3
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1DBD8 4324 bytes