Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 06c922b940ac7b9f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

64.9 KB Created: 2020-11-10 09:18:44 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-12
MD5: b006c9e06b1de44b28d3dc9cdce7f79a SHA-1: 3a17f8a86e82f64ff7fdcb7516f45d1b66634ad8 SHA-256: 06c922b940ac7b9fa22d337bc04774565bac4f87d75ae9228e447e530c952992
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file contains a large number of embedded links, many pointing to disposable domains and redirectors, indicating a link farm or phishing lure. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly suggest malicious intent, likely related to phishing or malware distribution. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and embedded URLs are indicative of an attempt to redirect users to malicious content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffking.ru/strik?keyword=old+versions+of+kik+apk In PDF document text
    • https://zitidatuviwe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134493200/sudexufekit.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://burufazifefep.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134584298/9492183.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zuzufejalapo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134684928/d0715c4c9.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mojivimimujovo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874437/038885c85ecf8f0.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://viwuwobigoku.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131378942/wavojetesut.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gesoroserazam.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134310447/pojojesilorudifikiv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4389830/normal_5fa0c9d09b3c7.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wesoxiworikezux.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380467/mosejorun.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xegabazoku.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134318522/temakod.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zirasave.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134096010/7827553.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nujidigazinuwag.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134318548/kowapomisopa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://subarijarasojud.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134332778/c6e51.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://turomanusogagi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453559/mubuvevubuvolumalez.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zugufavowi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874222/moximajiwabeter.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/jofunozuzof/the_unit_circle.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zubuwujoxom/8446669823.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000b83f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xB83F 5184 bytes
SHA-256: 8f9e4d0aa9359f8982bc346956600a2de9272925cc944e935dffe2634d369efb
font_01_sfnt_off0000c9f6.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC9F6 2140 bytes
SHA-256: 49dddaa543544930169c80d10742cf71a10a90771d945bdf421e53748b1fa594
font_02_sfnt_off0000d3d0.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD3D0 10164 bytes
SHA-256: 83e20642d32f21aaff180cf57192e7513c337223488492769baa247fbf30e2f3

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