Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 06c65c7c0bea1a42…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

273.0 KB Created: 2022-08-14 17:59:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2022-08-19
MD5: c8cb082e32884e0fba54588aec669f6a SHA-1: b8e717b87c1027edd81c7810bfe340d2013fa26b SHA-256: 06c65c7c0bea1a42fb25ba59da3cb81b0746e7065a307aa4f5a21e8ab06610b6
84 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The critical heuristic 'OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE' indicates that the embedded OLE object, specifically an Ole10Native package, is configured to drop an auto-executable payload. The presence of embedded OLE objects and extracted artifacts like 'ooxml_oleobject_00.bin' and 'ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin' strongly suggests a malicious intent to deliver a secondary stage. No scripts were extracted from this sample.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
ad9a741a10581bf8ad886216086035c1899ea58cbffc7e07ac8aa1ff03e00ec4		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 171008 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.96, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
e95d7a25eb01196701d0e3c846fcafd590001342f6a5df8ddc0497656945f7e8		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 166643 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
e6eee463d83643f1399b37b1a8dece493b2fad98953a819e4370401df670b93b		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image3.emf 5464 bytes

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