Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 06bc9376623db4cc…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

393.5 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2022-11-08
MD5: 3756ce8aed0982d9fe8fd2872127b388 SHA-1: 97ad781f23ce007d23cc75adbeb77fe6530ad6de SHA-256: 06bc9376623db4cc4ecd6afdc3dffb21f1345f3236d1cfe3fe45580635b474ca
148 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1566 Phishing T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The critical heuristic firing for CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE indicates the exploitation of a known vulnerability in Microsoft Equation Editor. The presence of an OLE object containing this payload strongly suggests the document is designed to exploit this vulnerability upon opening. No VBA macros were found to be executable, but the OLE object itself serves as the primary attack vector.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EDX) high SC_GETPC_CALL
    x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EDX)
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
82932134fd4a896ebf44fbda00ff27ed8934f555552befad457276cbfe5a46c3
ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD018B6B05/oLe10naTIVe 1741 bytes