Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 06ba80a54d5cc338…

MALICIOUS

PDF

89.2 KB Created: 2021-07-02 07:26:38 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: a85bbfd896469f49b60bbb13c9adea7a SHA-1: 1d1c45cb587831185aeacde8beac2ac0c3d9af07 SHA-256: 06ba80a54d5cc338fe6c3bd6396b68575f476065413196b89c423aab255f6a1c
204 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample was detected as a malicious PDF by ClamAV and an ML classifier, indicating a high likelihood of malicious intent. Heuristics indicate it uses a 'Browser Install Lure' and a 'Download Button' to trick users into installing malicious content. The document body is heavily obfuscated, but the presence of numerous links to compromised CMS upload storage and disposable hosting suggests a phishing or malware distribution scheme. No scripts were extracted, but the PDF structure itself likely facilitates the malicious download.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9835

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Browser extension / update installation lure high SE_BROWSER_INSTALL_LURE
    Document tells the user to install a browser extension, plugin, viewer, or browser update to view content — a common social-engineering path for credential theft and malware installation
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://dfa-finanz.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160d4d62d784e8---midenupevimezubijedez.pdf
    • http://analogsys.com/uploaded/file/1132519320609d4eb446cf1.pdf
    • http://ed-web.cz/userfilesfile/27063874368.pdf
    • http://asfus.net/virgsurv/userfiles/file/xerapuderabogi.pdf
    • https://peterdegendt.be/file/50965153611.pdf
    • http://hotelsandmartin.cz/files/file/13751625929.pdf
    • https://www.coconutlodge.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607c695f12510---ximunekevedovuzonamani.pdf
    • http://nmglyxx.com/userfiles/file/6143678915.pdf
    • https://alphaveneers.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/f74222f09f7cb813beb1630344f2cc4f/3809375919.pdf
    • http://www.haztartasigepszakuzlet.hu/pics/file/51446555738.pdf
    • https://www.limratechnologies.net/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c63022d760c---29111430527.pdf
    • https://www.kunapak.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/3hm29pmuv673d739d5gmmb6icq/87487845361.pdf
    • http://www.sensible-seeds-premium.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609a8af9a676f---buduperarexot.pdf
    • http://julieesteban.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ab0510cc90f---28213572382.pdf
    • https://oknoplus-omsk.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/d3966a5270829dd5483d37de31ea7463/mosabotitinexijovupapuluj.pdf
    • http://xn--vb0b83rba554gca.kr/page_data/file/20210619234808.pdf
    • https://globalclassic.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/8b195qtsligm03g86foii6gksv/24553351960.pdf
    • https://bojovicsirogojno.com//files/38177642521.pdf
    • http://accurateverdicts.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607810208749f---16398865521.pdf
    • http://www.leesii.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160823cc0a2cd7---kikobirif.pdf
    • http://volamtuyetthe.com/userfiles/file/wupokitegalavadakurazuf.pdf
    • http://worldcar.jp/userfiles/files/sudozalewexopef.pdf
    • https://senzedigicraft.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/1fd8a81ee7001a68fc188ae98dc864cf/60878424971.pdf
    • https://foundryindia.org/userfiles/file/lipilu.pdf
    • http://ifaistos.reality.gr/~triantaf/images/file/nizogu.pdf
    • https://progin.swiss/ckfinder/userfiles/files/203146765.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/S30rS-6n6vg/uplcv?utm_term=uyare+movie+download+with+english+subtitles
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f928.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF928 16792 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0001113f.bin
06180ab3b1c5b9123d76c69def8cb1b0fd157c8f204b33f81a099496a6b18cfc		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1113F 11208 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00012b20.bin
43bee7f642ddd6c35bc5e9e43101ac2c04d3d20eb1cd0e09dc7601744de9d9e0		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12B20 16952 bytes

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