Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 06a3c3cff1631cf4…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

84.5 KB Created: 2021-08-25 09:55:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: c4dac1eef40bf5ded8eb4fb2feef8c15 SHA-1: dc53fc76d704b6d13201ee61cb149354f8619306 SHA-256: 06a3c3cff1631cf486c6420e18b2bb2b7ee671ed273b94836e831a437badfaae
182 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains a VBA macro with an AutoOpen subroutine, which is a common technique for executing malicious code upon opening a document. The macro writes content to a file named '.HTA' and then executes it using 'scriptrunner'. This indicates the document is designed to download and execute a second-stage payload, likely for further malicious activity. The presence of the 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' heuristic further supports this, as it suggests the document attempts to trick the user into enabling macros.

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.BlueOffice08210-9889818-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.BlueOffice08210-9889818-0
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/tiff/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/exif/1.0/
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
1ffb76aef80c550298d2c8209920620fa06c72bb63f634f10a504478f3dc19db		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 830 bytes

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