Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 069c2e6f7dbaf794…

MALICIOUS

RTF

21.5 KB First seen: 2020-09-07
MD5: 2eefc5f70a9d00bcc49f87521fdc7675 SHA-1: 1b0b732e63a00b8c5e7dbd3d3a9443f5d52a589c SHA-256: 069c2e6f7dbaf794feb28bc32d90db33d030b6169c3a21133f5ad5cadf081c1b
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object that is activated via \objupdate, exploiting a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor. This technique is commonly used to achieve arbitrary code execution, typically to download and run a second-stage malicious payload. No specific family could be identified from the available evidence.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000912.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x912 2006 bytes
SHA-256: 76b1a0a1c93f728413bd2dc0da899465bc4cd9ec6805c7e4bed429f64e591201

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