Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0696eb512977d206…

MALICIOUS

RTF

4.32 MB First seen: 2021-07-02
MD5: 64c579aa981fd9bd1cf5562386b382ee SHA-1: ee0227e2f15ac6565301ff098f568d72e9dbece4 SHA-256: 0696eb512977d206198880e11db5d7eaded891169d1cf09b78a9c2f5882814e1
220 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains multiple indicators of malicious activity, including embedded OLE objects and specific firings for the CVE-2017-11882 exploit. The presence of the Equation Editor ProgID and the ".objupdate" directive strongly suggests an attempt to trigger this known vulnerability for code execution. The extracted artifacts, objdata_00_off000011e1.bin and objdata_01_off002b9f6f.bin, likely contain the shellcode or payload delivered by the exploit.

Heuristics 6

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000011e1.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x11E1 770774 bytes
SHA-256: e0db38506806cfb911a608740cd015f8dee42e57434c41f34e9137b5ca99f77c
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): Wscript.ScriptFullName
objdata_01_off002b9f6f.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2B9F6F 454791 bytes
SHA-256: abd132bf3ab8190dfb030bcb879a36061e9aef78c1060b63bd0588b35c7d316c