Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0696e2d6ab6b97ad…

MALICIOUS

PDF

31.3 KB Created: 2020-04-29 07:41:20 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.1.4 (via Qt 4.8.6)
MD5: 69bdb0762b24348c25aa2366ee5a1abd SHA-1: c613e74d496517d4cd850e5fba9f983b5291fe38 SHA-256: 0696e2d6ab6b97adddbaed0189e6edd05d1e031bdc9d3cb7bbd27bb8eb71d2a7
96 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of external links, many of which point to similarly structured URLs on different domains, suggesting a link farm or a method to distribute malicious content. The ML classifier strongly indicated maliciousness, and the PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM heuristic confirms the suspicious link structure. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the presence of embedded URLs and the nature of the link farm suggest an attempt to redirect users to potentially harmful content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9982

Heuristics 4

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://teamgls.com/uploads/1/3/0/5/130589322/130589322.html#sheridan+sheet+sale+brisbane
    • http://bogdanins.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437578/kalagiranidajila.pdf
    • http://trueadesign.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775826/vikibulipaduzoter.pdf
    • http://katefergwrites.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775200/nuzaxobejagej-fabemeler-woduro.pdf
    • http://thepinkpins.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070006/6582166.pdf
    • http://xspyra.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130639580/wogepugofepu.pdf
    • http://ardmoreentertainment.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739711/7779393.pdf
    • http://h2designstudios.com/uploads/1/3/0/3/130323211/9148457.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000514f.bin
550182c939036973056b3609cf0ab3b30379df886fbbd72f18928257492a2f00		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x514F 8368 bytes

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