Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 068a57632bec7404…

MALICIOUS

PDF

119.5 KB Created: 2021-06-26 00:55:56 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 766377a2e97379366e606d4eb081593c SHA-1: 50ae7bf0b60e093f98a33b0a090e7e837918ebe4 SHA-256: 068a57632bec74048ac47bfcad8f6a576745efd822f4bf56196017829e4de8d5
164 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF file was detected as malicious by ML classifiers and ClamAV, indicating a phishing or trojan threat. It functions as a link farm, containing numerous URLs that point to compromised CMS uploads and disposable hosting, likely intended to redirect users to malicious sites. The presence of external URI heuristics and the overall structure suggest an attempt to lure users into clicking on these links, potentially for credential harvesting or malware delivery.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9935

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Urgency / deadline lure low SE_URGENCY_LURE
    Document contains urgency or deadline language ('account will be terminated', 'action required within 24 hours', etc.) — useful context, but low-signal without other findings
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://hrjok.com/uploadfile/file/59420014117.pdf
    • http://alexhofford.com/temp/files/file/83128024466.pdf
    • http://pivotal-technologies.com/userfiles/file/74506079410.pdf
    • http://trackeg.com/en/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c55c9a804e1---358336446.pdf
    • http://www.chubsorn.com/file/files/buzivolatarijumiwazoxu.pdf
    • http://krindustria.com.br/site/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606f547875783---35022131813.pdf
    • http://e-district.org/userfiles/file/94382174443.pdf
    • https://www.cpro.fr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16085cff393206---11281115732.pdf
    • https://www.kadeavenue.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/92ef9e075aad0f177b238e920df85dab/semabikoriwarebitiwobik.pdf
    • https://thesmithgrouphouston.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/25deb868f809c33e7cb770f4a56d2396/87957462079.pdf
    • https://vannordenvastgoed.nl/userfiles/file/wetezabofurinizuvodivodej.pdf
    • http://www.blackhillsdancecentre.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160884657d05d7---vufopixifodokuxejawaz.pdf
    • https://stellabakingcompany.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a46df6bcfe2---7503724.pdf
    • http://prattsofdouds.com/clients/d/d8/d85aab9f4bcbae69c8358f7a9990a0b1/File/kakokuzuni.pdf
    • http://aliancegroup.su/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160cc7708941e0---fevifiwudalarazusiwabu.pdf
    • https://tungafilm.com/dorceiys/ckfinder/userfiles/files/sekurerobajano.pdf
    • http://briarcliff68.com/clients/71184/File/71675257324.pdf
    • https://terravistahometeam.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/c23f75cf12825fedac8a248ef0946f45/zutikirumarise.pdf
    • http://bradleyhillsapartments.com/demo/uploads/contents/file/buwowerawip.pdf
    • http://www.kevinbrooks.ca/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a520158245c---turakob.pdf
    • http://skup-laptopow.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607b2809280ef---35282412868.pdf
    • http://www.lbf-cosmetics.com/website/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160934fd92c3f4---tapikepexajotun.pdf
    • https://atlanthealth.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/6388d042097940e55d0f0891e2459117/34915842033.pdf
    • https://journeypeople.cc/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/e483d31983bb33db64b7812d6aff0d01/pinomigufogaza.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/A3Ryygt5BCM/uplcv?utm_term=shipping+fulfillment+centers
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00017255.bin
a3844ad2b8eda4ad89d43f2e05e47c975cf46aa08cfe8ff79fde0f77fc5d1cd6		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x17255 17368 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0001a000.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1A000 16792 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0001b817.bin
c204313cd465a51f5b235609a4b36021ddd9add05a393705062a76b552bb0fe3		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1B817 10820 bytes

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