Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCM — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 067d76406bcd95f8…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCM

48.6 KB Created: 2026-03-19 21:32:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2026-03-21
MD5: c75dc84c096b11a2ab0d15b9faf65923 SHA-1: 701ad957093e0dbfb80064477d2208d83df6f14d SHA-256: 067d76406bcd95f84fdc8106ac1d110208d28883f9d1f09445cbcd357f1d9818
230 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1071.001 Web Protocols

The sample is a DOCM file containing VBA macros. The critical heuristic 'OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_SHELL_URL' indicates that the VBA code attempts to execute a command that includes a URL, likely for downloading a secondary payload. The 'Shell()' and 'CreateObject()' calls further support this, suggesting an attempt to run external code. The macro logic appears to be designed to save the document with a modified name and potentially upload it to a specified host, though the exact destination URL is not fully reconstructed from the provided evidence.

Heuristics 7

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • Obfuscated VBA Shell command with URL critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_SHELL_URL
    VBA macro invokes Shell with command text assembled through decoder or string-manipulation functions and includes a URL. This is a high-confidence downloader/dropper pattern, stronger than Shell or URL evidence on their own.
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • External relationship high OOXML_EXTERNAL_REL
    External target in word/_rels/settings.xml.rels: file:///C:\Documents and Settings\User.CUBE\Application Data\Microsoft\Templates\Pleading form with 28 lines.dot
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://drive.meruscase.com/
    • https://drive-beta.meruscase.com/JOHNNYTEST.docx
    • https://drive-beta.meruscase.com/JOHNNYTEST.docx�
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2019/extlst
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2023/wordml/word16du
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2020/wordml/sdtdatahash
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2024/wordml/sdtformatlock
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
5feb05e486a13130f99ca2c4cd954fa53ee5015ecde36ae8098e85cab615a626		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 6073 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
aab07847b6c8d42677b73289d7ec4e1d2bd81a3fef7514ec2ce37653c8639262		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 19456 bytes

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