Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 06701631c1740802…

MALICIOUS

PDF

48.0 KB Created: 2020-10-28 14:21:31 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: e59f8e47003516d95cd0756d03dd2b37 SHA-1: 76ad287481ad266db83f14954a1ce6572489314d SHA-256: 06701631c1740802a6590d975799e85ad17f7f31d13b684e1314cece15efcb06
162 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains numerous embedded links, with a critical heuristic identifying a link to known malicious redirector infrastructure. Another heuristic indicates a large link farm, suggesting a SEO poisoning or spamming campaign. The document body, though obfuscated, contains URLs that align with these findings, and the presence of a 'download' button lure reinforces the malicious intent. No scripts were extracted, but the primary attack vector appears to be social engineering via deceptive links.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.club/123?keyword=wen+6510+vs+6510t
    • https://joleziravakejar.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134460301/3598183.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366022/normal_5f8708f3ec48f.pdf
    • https://sirawomaperuli.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131398091/vujemaxukevazow_jarirojavow_gagusedimu_lovumipagete.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4369163/normal_5f88c0dbec948.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4388407/normal_5f941a2513567.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4365619/normal_5f86fb4c7f7ec.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0493/5421/1487/files/gumamosiwixalamerizenuves.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0496/6324/6485/files/85998707620.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/suzitivasekoga/game_hacker_no_root_apk.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/fusidejebi/japakezi.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/bezutu/tan_card_application_form.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/palikuvexake/9616033736.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/tanikanaw/ahmedabad_city_information_in_gujarati.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/jufowokedunod/tapejobudevituwakinori.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/2758/6472/files/vitetotis.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/jotizifime/widupipato.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
stream_005_off0000988f.bin
9488718f52c45f1716d61c28192a7e0539e24765c911004012847877cfb2fb31		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x988F 17572 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off000065bf.bin
c2ecccefbbde7a6f9d0793a646b04ed7c12c7f6c7f2a190d875f8faaa33547d6		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x65BF 4888 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00007697.bin
4a577b8b2317053423ad160940d5e64eb1fe28b67dedcba7805e52b467cf6f3d		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7697 9940 bytes

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