Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 065878a808a1b7fd…

MALICIOUS

PDF

78.5 KB Created: 2021-03-12 15:46:45 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: c1140e9d79eeabc0660dbca47a42de2f SHA-1: 32a4129c642d6c82d8068c2954d95cfcb8654261 SHA-256: 065878a808a1b7fd7302eb4ebd408853fb8195b7146e4872b200f756dff7eeac
126 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains numerous external links, with a heuristic specifically identifying it as a link farm on disposable hosting. The 'DOC BODY' content, though heavily obfuscated, includes terms like 'notepad xml validation plugin' and 'wkhtmltopdf', suggesting a pretext for directing users to malicious or phishing websites. The presence of multiple unknown URLs and the ClamAV detection as 'Pdf.Phishing.Trojan' strongly indicate a phishing or malware distribution attempt.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://golowaki.ru/123?utm_term=notepad+xml+validation+plugin
    • http://selozufuwadapuw.66ghz.com/goodreads_free.pdf
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4408981/normal_5fcb696980597.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4464707/normal_6026e4e035e46.pdf
    • http://masterpowerpoint.com/xejuluwotofolumezmtnxc.pdf
    • http://rulakegigarapo.22web.org/judasemi.pdf
    • http://moneymaya.site/mifadogju97u.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://104e0e48-a4c2-4a03-8647-06ef64d4e6ac.filesusr.com/ugd/e2c6c1_554ecb049318489097cd7be822f95a87.pdf?index=true
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/sasufufa/vobovaxexosa.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/fotepopunaj/precalculus_enhanced_with_graphing_utilities_4th_edition.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/vexeliku/84261003431.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/ce2e41ec-d5b5-4874-a2d3-5e20e2998d8c/tesla_model_3_lr_awd_0-60.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zinudipir/81719730535.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/479fde87-7a0b-4f7f-8ec6-c4b922b364c9/teoria_del_conflicto_trabajo_social.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/e4e7db71-618b-40d5-afb3-3e3b5f9001e4/63603086877.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/373dad16-9cc6-4f4c-8cc2-5f2299c43c91/do_you_need_a_license_to_use_baofeng_uv-5r.pdf
    • https://77483064-5892-4b52-b419-66e751946b77.filesusr.com/ugd/ef7b09_4767f4a7f3424fa69c9448164c44b44b.pdf?index=true
    • http://xamukuxoze.epizy.com/adobe_after_effect_2017.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/vokeri/app_crashes_after_splash_screen_android_xamarin.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/61242bbe-7aa7-4f76-9e4b-7c4b5cc5d88f/rutupekarozaledeveke.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e4a0.bin
005b420de6fe61312e3e8e41035b9ff1155e95c3b512fd62c88fcb607e2a6de3		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE4A0 5104 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000f5f4.bin
c14a7261fc73024d8eb5a71744047bba87e284d88f493d6fd64b95d3292805af		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF5F4 2448 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off000100a0.bin
8df3c3964c2ce2be0aa6ee8ece7ccf23f3046cb2b2e95f7d4a8a89270c342337		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x100A0 14704 bytes

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