Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0651077fbb3ca318…

MALICIOUS

PDF

84.8 KB Created: 2020-11-13 08:43:52 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-22
MD5: 06ce611154ed20b6103c4b6651038450 SHA-1: aa1aa2f9bac168e0522da815c47accebb07b417b SHA-256: 0651077fbb3ca318eaec967c8241ca85f25e5aef04fb34fd3894878aa2facd70
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of external links, many pointing to disposable hosting services, indicating a link farm designed to distribute traffic. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly suggest malicious intent, likely phishing or malware delivery. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and numerous external URIs are indicative of techniques used to redirect users to malicious sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://trafftec.ru/aws?utm_term=afmc+bd+question+paper+2016+pdf PDF link annotation
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4414486/normal_5f9be802b0675.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lidenezat.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134382714/2288301.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://valoxapemep.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134305175/bubarasimilew.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tidivexosito.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134316292/3965997.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dejolezeg.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132815968/8111761.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dubitofux.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134458445/b8603ab1d10485f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dirigesibujov.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969991/f9498.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zupusifeduligam.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134313264/wakig_tifol.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://saxibodusazo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740440/ruwupiwexisifi-fikaritowunu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jisogixisizula.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134328009/kofanovule.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/a8bb8d75-2c38-44d4-92b7-540da065ea9b/crewe_nord_mpd.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/c44eb9b6-c056-4f1b-ad6a-c5bfa89f12ca/43728907902.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/b5fde765-be38-425f-93f8-9966458fd953/wakesifimufizoroleg.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/915b98c9-b8ae-4cb9-b29c-dbb85c8d10fc/aegis_x_vape_manual.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/99fd2c04-8e22-4277-a773-3bfd85bd6519/52118016383.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000fe4a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFE4A 5884 bytes
SHA-256: 280b44efbde0283dd77c4c9285ac22611a9369343abc8dc42c3cd039e0880004
font_01_sfnt_off00011231.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11231 11152 bytes
SHA-256: 485751d3e47b198ed3c433d9852bcc9182a1c8d5373cff222388775262e6f17a
font_02_sfnt_off00013836.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x13836 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 7f6049e5011acf0e8581793f2bc2bb947aac2929fdb77abc318b2a6155c1ef71

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