Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 062d34db4b017abd…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

596.0 KB Created: 2014-05-24 05:41:58 First seen: 2023-08-24
MD5: 0a1870e8c8561e27d9f2ed159655ab96 SHA-1: 35b22385f22145334356a3ff57fd3ec9cb1cb2c6 SHA-256: 062d34db4b017abd6ed1c604b5b60f1b336564cd858af1f314c704f7c4ffea93
490 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic for Applications T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1140 Deobfuscate or Obfuscate Malicious Code

The critical heuristics indicate the presence of an obfuscated auto-executing VBA loader within the Excel file, specifically utilizing `WScript.Shell` and `CreateObject` to likely download and execute a secondary payload. The `Workbook_Open` event is triggered, and the embedded URL `http://www.frez.co.uk` is present, suggesting it may be used as a download source. The presence of a password-protected archive lure heuristic further supports a multi-stage infection chain.

Heuristics 13

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • Reference to Windows Script Host high SC_STR_WSCRIPT
    Reference to Windows Script Host
  • Workbook_Open macro high OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Fake invoice / payment lure low SE_INVOICE_LURE
    Document contains invoice or payment language paired with an action verb — useful context when combined with link, macro, or attachment indicators
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.frez.co.uk

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
6849d0f9a921af2a4050142995175f88b324e808a2c40198ee1f132392587d47		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 578556 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).

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