Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 06266c05c4ad3fc8…

MALICIOUS

PDF

98.9 KB Created: 2021-07-03 14:15:15 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-09-29
MD5: ed0cddcce0ab867371a7db60d2656b74 SHA-1: 1f01fbf37a7153ba4f836fadc0a4bc0c10733e76 SHA-256: 06266c05c4ad3fc869a9ab82ed7731b8a3dfa66f80720bb99f34119cb1b2ad29
236 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF file contains numerous links to external resources, many hosted on compromised WordPress sites, suggesting a phishing or malware distribution campaign. The 'SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE' heuristic indicates the document instructs users to interact with the clipboard in a way that could lead to command execution, likely to download and execute a malicious payload. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection further support its malicious nature.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9987

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://wastran.ru/uplcv?utm_term=mac+cleanup+pro+ad+removal PDF link annotation
    • https://terravistahometeam.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/58ef6da84b198502b568f848938ac7e1/41523011761.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://msslink.ru/userfiles/files/53316913411.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dangkykinhdoanhkiengiang.com/upload/ck/files/xukonexoxosuda.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://gleneaglehoa.org/images/file/fuwarufojuwevoveraguz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://babamoleskine.com/files/file/koxozejofuvajaku.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://abapaposentados.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16084d5a99f9d8---sogetivogosixesigefofe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wccia-vastu.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/45a2586a6ba2c2087b09d48a0734b8cc/xefezonuwonorerik.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://mobilesamara.com/img/files/file/mubitimuxukiwebi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vietxetai.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/dckomvi2082ccu6niipndb7h45/napugasege.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ventana-sur.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160adc770d1d79.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bulendengin.com/upload/ckfinder/files/65820762837.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.bouldersudbury.org/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16091a61576b5c---30663883896.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bamt.be/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160837c09ece0a---webanijoporaf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://primewestelectrical.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/01c2172cfb1cb20f2a2437cb59cb8a72/64391236498.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ibadirect.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160de67c077a2e---lifelixetikixabaz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.louthadventures.ie/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c9b9366ae6d---28113159499.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.cdscabling.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16098e4e766b55---81920249608.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xn--78-6kce7dfhb9dwb.xn--p1ai/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5194280344a921978fcd7b72fe472578/69028956469.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://artistalexanderkanevskywinnerinternationalaward.com/clientMedia/file/dalob.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lightsourceindiana.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/99b5bc5978ed37f356f54b824748824e/jowusilibomopa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00011be9.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11BE9 18556 bytes
SHA-256: 59940524157c51d7031451de1115300e28afafd8b6277c80770b28045892a3d7
font_01_sfnt_off00014d3c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x14D3C 10476 bytes
SHA-256: e499e83607707b10e4c8ca71256fd2dd98e36dad0817f8282e0309178b6e9419
font_02_sfnt_off00016508.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x16508 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

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