RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · 0618d49a04b31ad8

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

457.8 KB

MD5: 23405a259182245b0287912d51eec614 SHA-1: 7c5b4ccd8e05deb46ce31108747a4284c00dfe55 SHA-256: 0618d49a04b31ad8cd26d4c77e29d3f79833d73cd557f3c676893aef9acab286

202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object that exploits the CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability in Microsoft Equation Editor. This exploit is known to download and execute a second-stage payload, indicated by the critical heuristic firings and the presence of a suspicious OLE object. The document body is heavily obfuscated and does not provide further clues about the specific lure.

Heuristics 6

Equation Editor OLE1 native payload — CVE-2017-11882 related critical CVE related CVE_2017_11882_RELATED

RTF decodes to an OLE1 Equation.3 embedded object whose native data is large and payload-like, and \objupdate requests automatic activation. This is the delivery shape used by Equation Editor RCE documents such as CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802, but the malformed MTEF record needed for exact attribution was not recovered.
Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000a66.bin` `52cbe5a58dcdc62058ce95bd8f99ba06da9c1f009ddae1e55c87a682748e5009`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xA66	232977 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.

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