Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0610ca079cbd41d0…

MALICIOUS

RTF

108.5 KB First seen: 2024-08-21
MD5: 317adb82df51a092951746b6af150470 SHA-1: ef5075b0ec0667db270fd1623a310170aef94c4a SHA-256: 0610ca079cbd41d02b55144f5df7d136cb3a69344cb14a979d39f774b6d542e4
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object that exploits a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor. The ".objupdate" directive forces the activation of this object, which is designed to download and execute a secondary payload. The presence of the Equation Editor exploit and the OLE object strongly indicates a malicious intent to compromise the user's system.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001be3.bin
4abf52c39db4c7d7d2c80754dc620e6e5ef673290653a34ad787de61882390ab		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1BE3 2337 bytes

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