Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 060ce54055d7a051…

MALICIOUS

PDF

46.3 KB Created: 2020-08-30 02:47:12 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: ac36f5a6c721ea9bf96b0dc820224bd5 SHA-1: e79c5560491b1cf83c0eb88fbd733c0dd261b96d SHA-256: 060ce54055d7a051a58a1c9ce0ebdc1e6e391b71d3fa2dfec26a9e12849a9dc4
194 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF document contains a lure to copy and paste content into a command-line interface, as indicated by the 'SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE' heuristic. It also embeds a link to a known malicious redirector, 'https://ttraff.ru/wix?keyword=network+and+sharing+center+command+windows+10', which is likely used to deliver a secondary payload. The ML classifier also flagged this PDF as malicious with high confidence.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/wix?keyword=network+and+sharing+center+command+windows+10
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/2821/0073/files/gijuvulanifudisurenizaxig.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/6667/0745/files/vuzedilikatani.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/4219/4083/files/82198460056.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/7516/6620/files/16983336009.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/e2f7e1_633836c2c6f44da29d08d80077051097.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_127b7f64e5fe454c97d8858f93b75350.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_e90bf73675f04c30b8fc7ed03ca40738.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/0a0016_74cedbb1ef914f7c94a72ec67afa3e38.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/d99ef3_bba24896d9c64a188032a3488a68b6c3.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_cc77888b63c54c609c48469be275e08c.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b58d21_63d493fca621401686a8eeb9151a591d.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/48d9a1_c3724dd3b12644bd92cc6ab7ad9961c3.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_04709d29d7f440bb9faddb0415b5f13f.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/822ecd_0ff9c311e66d43cb9571611535861245.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000754f.bin
e82f94a246205bae0b93deeb09354c8bfbeb26a911d29e92ad18cab1d33ce5c6		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x754F 5640 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000886c.bin
ab4549595200107583faedbcc5a24ee24870db5f6692b1dcff769df55ad8fc39		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x886C 10720 bytes

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