Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 06088c15f43fa35d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.22 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-10-16
MD5: de5cc53b872c5f5039a00e0ae0ea74de SHA-1: 9bb3276d9282586a65a22e862febfe4f44e6a7e4 SHA-256: 06088c15f43fa35d6f7dd20ce125b95d4a1cdefb816c8981883c696ace621dfc
312 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.001 Malicious Link: Malicious Link T1566 Phishing T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic

The file is an Excel spreadsheet containing an embedded Equation Editor object, which is a known vector for exploiting CVE-2017-11882. This object contains a payload that, when triggered, leads to the execution of a secondary PDF file. The PDF file itself contains a direct payload link to 'https://https://www.google.co.in/example.com', indicating a downloader or exploit delivery mechanism. No VBA macros were found to be executable, suggesting the primary attack relies on the OLE object and the embedded PDF.

Heuristics 9

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • PDF link points directly to executable/archive payload critical PDF_DIRECT_PAYLOAD_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) URI whose path ends in an executable, script, shortcut, disk image, or archive extension. Documents can legitimately link to installers, so this is a high-risk delivery indicator rather than a standalone exploit fingerprint.
  • x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EBX) high SC_GETPC_CALL
    x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EBX)
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://https://www.google.co.in/example.com
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/

Extracted artifacts 7

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
0bedd32ea8c7bec8ef74cc8e5bea59e33d01f9a02d0a98c97ddecca9bc6aa980		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1812 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
895dd5ad8977c9fe4fd15d7508963dce8395346285f7ff80764e8ac28d9b9a40		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD00101C43/OlE10naTIvE 1184 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00075400.pdf
091718ea75fa49f1c3b7ce62539274b734eea45daed95ebe6d2a02a19b1d6cb8		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x75400 801280 bytes
stream_004_off00005d60.bin
2998a126f4fa11ceb265371a5f7968ec18bc4692a32631a544232dc74040021f		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x5D60 252488 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001200.pdf
6a6938179fa743ab912f67a737f4d84a84b8bce13d82ef8706934585a69264b7		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1200 1276928 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00006600.pdf
706470ea7eee7cbe6db9818dcfd8f3811e2b4dcf0c60c0f02232d7ebe4a30731		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6600 1255424 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00029600.pdf
6a8364657111771b8a5acfe143dee2dae6515b2fa82c6a3aa8fcde53ee961e3b		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x29600 1112064 bytes

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