Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 060148ac82f02b06…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

25.7 KB First seen: 2022-11-15
MD5: 5e8652e4a319c88cebf6ab15f1d47975 SHA-1: 223029522161f18c1fbca0ea724df76c37060889 SHA-256: 060148ac82f02b062e2c08d56e7b268a2f97a3642863d0230c17fe66e35eea56
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, a known exploit technique. The SE_ENABLE_LURE heuristic indicates the document prompts the user to enable editing, which would trigger the embedded object's activation via \objupdate. This suggests the file is a dropper or exploit document designed to leverage the Equation Editor vulnerability.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000491f.bin
d204dc54ef034e47146c25c44ebf1cca7c65648d88358432b06c591451a4d6ff
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x491F 1671 bytes