Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 05fe5a3d1b672132…

MALICIOUS

PDF

79.3 KB Created: 2021-03-30 04:48:11 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-08-20
MD5: 4aaf4379596a7ddb7fc44c8345277235 SHA-1: c5ce4b577292790e594414aa40f3f8a5e2342383 SHA-256: 05fe5a3d1b6721322f71cbcae750485e12e387ecfbc13a40c8da0b4c7865c5e8
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains a large number of external links, many pointing to disposable domains and Weebly/epizy.com hosting, indicating a link farm. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly suggest malicious intent, likely related to phishing or distributing further malware. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and URL patterns are consistent with SEO manipulation or a phishing lure.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://nipisod.ru/aws?utm_term=plot+and+structure+of+the+destructors PDF link annotation
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/zebimapajod/gdHibie/movies_near_me_regal_rockville.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tafebitekule.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776603/nuxone.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://biwomewiwuxe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/1/134131409/tuzubuted.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zikotidule.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134604350/bufeg-duravivago.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/letarezetap/gchdjaG/lolegafofapolad.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/belexewuwif/00vR8jd/lutikegeganepiwofozuxu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://meribukefola.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134314312/kuwifex_gelon_pesowam.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/pesofesidoke/9vtdjbG/pogezedavuloduli.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://soguleta.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134305846/jaxibisosepi_muvuza_zomibimam.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/femelofep/ihehfbj/27735221070.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/budajawisore/ghjhIDG/zulavu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/vojofarakiva/i961zjb/10122618099.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zonivezada/32395730312.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sixusugiw.rf.gd/bissell_powerforce_helix_parts_list.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lokimutopilar.epizy.com/access_control_software_operation_guide.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xawegusuwavol.epizy.com/podizutafuve.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://rufeluvogoweva.epizy.com/11684202958.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://legujajojozete.epizy.com/child_development_and_pedagogy_in_odia.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/fofeguj/template_powerpoint_free_education.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f6f5.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF6F5 5112 bytes
SHA-256: 95099749c313d89f0ba097e81a5a2cee24448382df5bef1498a1d0f79f31f38b
font_01_sfnt_off00010854.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10854 11160 bytes
SHA-256: 6a2f848d8bd21413bca06d8a1c96d4356e6912bf968b25e5e5ddf72a76a07075

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