Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 05f44149a971195b…

MALICIOUS

RTF

4.6 KB
MD5: 4cef603ee07f0f15ae2eef296dfe9682 SHA-1: 037df13486b95d3755487197fb39ab2add89dcce SHA-256: 05f44149a971195bd9686796fd6b5eeb081841fb5f442215113791a51d599083
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. This indicates an attempt to exploit a client execution vulnerability, likely delivered as a spearphishing attachment. The embedded OLE object data was decoded but did not contain further actionable IOCs.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000096.bin
9e17901df2db3497daf1669c1c92931e9a14e6b9dce5fa4c4889286c5bdffa5e		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x96 2084 bytes

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