Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 05d5099c2402c357…

MALICIOUS

PDF

87.8 KB Created: 2021-01-01 01:47:00 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-12
MD5: 3855738d1fb0fe3fe22b5c5814bf1d4e SHA-1: 945a52f2be43561c441d0774f5afe1d4702c8d2a SHA-256: 05d5099c2402c357dfbc3aaa9a1dd594117f110ed7b9c4f10dd38812f451a2a2
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF document contains a significant number of embedded links, with many pointing to disposable domains and redirector infrastructure, indicating a link farm designed to distribute malicious content. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly suggest malicious intent, likely related to phishing or malware delivery via these links. No scripts were extracted, but the primary attack pattern involves leveraging external URLs.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffmen.ru/strik?utm_term=american+football+positions+and+what+they+do In PDF document text
    • https://kijatuvoriwoze.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134352029/vivobebumomam.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4445743/normal_5fae09377583c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4422382/normal_5fcea3f70ba0c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wosiwimobej.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131164223/5bbc97a77.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/fovuxugo/jcqijhh/74847858432.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wusumojasojufe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134352244/5661180.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mokoxofedig.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134891763/7001280.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kisogegexene.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134374262/keniguz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kelinabak.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134728495/voser_rerivux_vuforev.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xexovelez.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813416/desepawizizo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tufiganifipira.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134310976/zizikasenejanur.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dirigesibujov.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969991/57003.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/sikuva/sepujufododum.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000119e8.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x119E8 5716 bytes
SHA-256: 3056eafd2b9ff442552c79ed30155aa85857bf11c55d3442eda92b41eff8a163
font_01_sfnt_off00012d41.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12D41 10796 bytes
SHA-256: 52103addcb0d628d3841aa18a7150bbe2ed6ae35d066f531b92175e2475c6d26

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