Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 05b288a5f0deaac5…

MALICIOUS

PDF

43.5 KB Created: 2020-07-08 17:29:12 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2020-09-24
MD5: 9e2d68cce67e63c6b3435b5156fb6c47 SHA-1: 522e20d6e442a19cd55ecfbc0bbcfcc7a73a6bdc SHA-256: 05b288a5f0deaac5cdee3f20d72f8f86d33ba81bf311c58b3dbc3971cc63c35f
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, many pointing to disposable domains and potentially malicious redirectors. The ML classifier strongly indicated maliciousness. The primary heuristic firings suggest this PDF is part of a link farm designed to redirect users to other content, possibly for SEO manipulation or to host further malicious payloads.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/wb?keyword=tdm%20multiplexing%20pdf In PDF document text
    • http://files.grandbendsoccer.ca/uploads/1/3/1/8/131871894/mirelukexuger.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.ferryport.org/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969386/figusidijemikifesi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.melaniedaylelauren.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681281/lexula.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.businessbcs.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132740343/e9c81eaa854.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.nikkidisney.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874647/busazowajewurulofab.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.gilliantorckler.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874629/gomenevidi-kinepowa-xasokipa-xupuzateseroji.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.unidadepastoral.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437351/195585ef.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://bazugilaj.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/79404045164.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rejukuvis.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/lelafoditibuvogowoka.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://magujilan.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/67324610153.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jujitefafise.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/25165022810.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://podedovebut.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/titereme.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kurifubiguxa.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/fixiselo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jetotijunedi.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/55767841276.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/ganisififado.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/gofifarigomikidapowokov.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/53607129813.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006e99.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6E99 4664 bytes
SHA-256: e6bf3dc77fcaf2d095e16d90dc5f4682f1abc5d1574935e4d17cab1fcbdf6c3e
font_01_sfnt_off00007e67.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7E67 10232 bytes
SHA-256: e0f6769b16d5aebcb5e2cc0b5e31a5029e3c9742fb9abfe768b4dd0a6e1d4e9f