Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 059ad7163311e624…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.9 KB
MD5: 815669b94c0c31a271420c84247805b9 SHA-1: 85126eefd03f6a80c094b4ccf0c6ccb82758ec83 SHA-256: 059ad7163311e624a3dc91e3532c2c55f522cf36956bd8c21cdebcfd6295dcea
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF document that contains embedded OLE object data, specifically related to Equation Editor. Heuristics indicate a high likelihood of exploitation for CVE-2017-11882, which allows for arbitrary code execution. This is a common method for delivering malicious payloads via spearphishing attachments.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000ba.bin
960e89025781c75a44eadc624aee0df58c4e950bab41a41f6932f655197c1269
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBA 1720 bytes