Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0592000f5b077c3a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

48.4 KB Created: 2020-09-30 08:50:45 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-10
MD5: aac6f05d6cebe4b039d5f8d83edde761 SHA-1: 9b81e1674f1ceb99ee3d1677872d834a3796aa14 SHA-256: 0592000f5b077c3ac366db8b4db575127e8c78a6201df2d975b591b17c52016e
184 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/strik?keyword=agile+project+management+with+kanban+eric+brechner+pdf+download In PDF document text
    • http://files.alchemyharvests.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132695582/4940393.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dobizaso.australianupholstery.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738568/179fdee25d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.dollarsignapparel.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070149/kajunokejirirer.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://damol.bidittle.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969862/zibedubuva.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036637.mozfiles.com/files/1036637/12490336273.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037240.mozfiles.com/files/1037240/32367146408.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036848.mozfiles.com/files/1036848/43431084466.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037251.mozfiles.com/files/1037251/wixuf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037188.mozfiles.com/files/1037188/volumaxisibuzejufamu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037098.mozfiles.com/files/1037098/vemow.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036958.mozfiles.com/files/1036958/zafunu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036695.mozfiles.com/files/1036695/99158867058.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037130.mozfiles.com/files/1037130/wunizeted.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037141.mozfiles.com/files/1037141/galevekosisedabewuxaper.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/520dcd45-70bb-4e4f-b43d-e8b4fdad582d/muxomoputevinikugizujere.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/72d50470-8d55-439d-9595-15b0c2872503/91268950167.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/297f9402-2ed0-42a8-867a-afc513ffce3f/52403508473.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/59b9e947-5700-4f61-995b-19c945f8cf05/82679001183.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/5dbb2bd0-8a3a-49e0-acbc-758cb60c8d68/76978516141.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000708f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x708F 5540 bytes
SHA-256: 966f8e65c2259396ece07b9ddb7d78fa6b35acfe54c1e96aba0a2c410b4bd1ce
font_01_sfnt_off0000833e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x833E 10180 bytes
SHA-256: 5375587e6db84a696b3b4c3513fd4ee0ea3e6a811677aa2967caf667256251b2
font_02_sfnt_off0000a60d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xA60D 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 0d0f64e27578eb124b8bc81c7eceacdd166e22eddd95c81328e9fbd7de2a6333

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