Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0582f619104d6f77…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

140.1 KB Created: 2021-02-07 17:10:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 263b04aed4c14d9a8e08d7012e9b307b SHA-1: 572c508ad05ca302af28901cd2bf4472e89e2f6f SHA-256: 0582f619104d6f7752def517b26c5339b3b86a0985bfee37a0a1fe9e75657f4a
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample contains VBA macros, including an AutoOpen subroutine, which is a common technique for executing malicious code upon document opening. The script attempts to download a file from the URL "http://elettrico.cyou/footer.jpg" and save it as "C:\users\Public\wiku.jpg", indicating an intent to fetch and execute a second-stage payload. The presence of CreateObject calls and HTTP requests further supports this malicious behavior.

Heuristics 7

  • VBA downloads and writes a file to disk critical OLE_VBA_HTTP_DROP_EXEC
    VBA reads an HTTP response body and writes it to disk (ADODB.Stream SaveToFile). Combined with the auto-exec/Shell paths this is a download-drop dropper even when the COM ProgIDs are built dynamically to evade keyword scanning.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.BlueWord12210-9918949-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.BlueWord12210-9918949-0
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
83f06d4349e042db2d29d7a5288ab7511c7944b62f78eed6f2634b05b862e2a0		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 2262 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
8a650df02f3f25e7f1b6f5456ed2bd09784f70c386219bb8fe644c2d958bceed		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 99328 bytes

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