RTF malware analysis — malicious · 0579b258d0be73b2

MALICIOUS

RTF

12.6 KB

MD5: fd6c617a0e1b28942efe0c2586efd2fb SHA-1: 0b54e7917de7c55924b0b3082ee95dd39df214e4 SHA-256: 0579b258d0be73b20cd434e8004e2bcd134f3277915f30f743f03f9b55fe0cf6

120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains OLE object data and triggers an Equation Editor exploit, indicating it's designed to execute arbitrary code. The ".bin" file extracted via objdata is likely the second-stage payload. The presence of ".objupdate" further suggests an attempt to force OLE object activation for exploitation.

Heuristics 3

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00001f4b.bin` `427f7bbec04fe91c4516612dacac44a8e1c75ad8684c38cad9fd387b45f1cc9e`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1F4B	1811 bytes

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