Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0552e2b6f0cf1869…

MALICIOUS

RTF

4.4 KB
MD5: 700aca1a74fddccb3e40527d3034e543 SHA-1: 3b383d463e1154ca43c0cf8db21d67a86fd047a0 SHA-256: 0552e2b6f0cf186965e041d2a89b7a9a3c852578b54f7a84c403dbda3bc52861
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. This indicates an attempt to exploit a client execution vulnerability, likely delivered as a spearphishing attachment. No further IOCs were extracted from the file.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000094.bin
04a5ba46c9997d4dd8bb581e68f987ea4182ec6e412dabbe98484b96a3c8bb2c
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x94 2049 bytes