Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0551dac2bca6e417…

MALICIOUS

PDF

87.0 KB Created: 2021-07-05 10:55:40 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 9bfbf93c7943219c29895a6971c8eb0a SHA-1: 286c9328911526d87ccc670f73fcff2e5184d9ea SHA-256: 0551dac2bca6e4174b4e1c2fb5e8a1940cd5179987a2213f44d37c87b25f1008
236 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains numerous links to external sites, many of which appear to be compromised WordPress uploads, suggesting a distribution mechanism for malicious content. The 'SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE' heuristic indicates the document instructs users to copy/paste content into a command-line interface, a common tactic for executing downloaded payloads. ClamAV also detected this file as a phishing trojan.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9952

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.sandzthabapanel.co.za/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16079af7aececc---guruv.pdf
    • https://infravoip.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/40697de571fad341e8fbcac79ad2cecc/rubuw.pdf
    • http://akbmodel.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160970f4b0f968---wunosejo.pdf
    • https://www.olympusnorge.no/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ge0nqr720ll9h604n461790iqd/76153910890.pdf
    • https://baodinhsolar.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/nlh1jfn8gmiqg4c47lkmh3jtp6/53468172314.pdf
    • https://cavalier-hundezucht.ch/userfiles/file/47828516400.pdf
    • http://whs1979.net/clients/65916/File/64714385713.pdf
    • http://xpressup.com/userfiles/file/zofigutu.pdf
    • http://didula.com/img/file/kilapemizejowob.pdf
    • http://theeultimatenetworker.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/40482878047.pdf
    • https://www.hintonassociates.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/d6f390ed3c5920ae4634df7f53f12ea2/33659877756.pdf
    • http://pulsrmedia.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609849f04c948---birosogibozobagumavubanur.pdf
    • http://artistalexanderkanevskywinnerinternationalaward.com/clientMedia/file/bofokojoxiwukufite.pdf
    • https://fonixkoncert.hu/upload/file/38144955186.pdf
    • https://muachungbaohiem.com/uploads/userfiles/file/1348660552.pdf
    • http://mouaumfb.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16096ba00e57ce---23843668804.pdf
    • https://sv-fin.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/47eb88fec7599e6a53d2293124cfc9f5/kadeposelipoxiwadi.pdf
    • https://njsolarpower.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/7343efa86acab68355baf400285477c5/vakudibiwaxenebagajijixu.pdf
    • http://superplasticizer.cn/d/files/66441981486.pdf
    • https://wills.sg/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/b6a70a2a9b5f55e2bbaeda1c1c4fa0b3/gosawe.pdf
    • https://afanasyev-design.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/3f8acc39291ffe86b36d4e22c93092c7/2496257721.pdf
    • https://aspit.ro/imagini_ws/78056734205.pdf
    • https://www.webplease.it/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/7puht12grln6hl8e53e5h239qq/90752242326.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/GLLx1DTH0VQ/uplcv?utm_term=activate+office+365+windows+10
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f03f.bin
f98fd731292254d5466b2ebe2fa489f1b28fa520929df99fd5a428e1fc8afc2e
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF03F 11104 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00010a7f.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10A7F 16792 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00012291.bin
2d2be4fea0b59dc81c2282fcc28a2e5df6d26da7be144d6d8d669d27e4d25f95
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12291 17076 bytes