Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 054448283e9c5ecb…

MALICIOUS

PDF

38.7 KB Created: 2020-06-12 11:51:39 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: c03ea716eddd2e75157f60cb0b3984e4 SHA-1: 321d8b84404fddd17d98238acb6669982e6291ad SHA-256: 054448283e9c5ecbf5fef3ac6e810258156ecf28384d4151be13b0700d4c8573
96 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF document contains numerous external links, a technique often used for SEO manipulation or to redirect users to malicious sites. The ML classifier strongly indicated maliciousness, and the PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM heuristic confirms the presence of a link farm. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the embedded URLs are the primary indicators of compromise, suggesting a potential redirection to further malicious content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 4

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://bruceave.net/uploads/1/3/0/6/130621874/130621874.html#sesion+%25C3%25A9+uma+palavra+aguda+grave+ou
    • http://cpruonline.com/uploads/1/3/0/2/130274028/2970514.pdf
    • http://belladanceteams.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131637209/lebov.pdf
    • http://chantellscloset.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130620401/soxan.pdf
    • http://mail.allsaintsmemorial.org/uploads/1/3/1/6/131636758/foruxalisu-vatatofifepatob.pdf
    • http://markheggaircraft.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130620750/1327846.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://kudikinojov.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/lejenelosanisaze.pdf
    • https://tujozoxi.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/75822762139.pdf
    • https://nagewod.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/36427145932.pdf
    • https://fiwojinugir.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/40497214650.pdf
    • https://walumuvov.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/zariwaluvuwibiwubum.pdf
    • https://patodulamup.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/16149929955.pdf
    • https://dopajazafol.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/12040098531.pdf
    • https://xiletemud.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/biwonifufot.pdf
    • https://lejaginu.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/noxarix.pdf
    • https://polobepokug.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/jerawakifazuvabavow.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006545.bin
09b9fb9888f15377cfc5fdf647fc9fb50aa7c0b24ac00f288714634ed728cf9d		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6545 13240 bytes

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