Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 053b4b634c121a85…

MALICIOUS

PDF

69.3 KB Created: 2021-05-27 11:20:07 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 1208b9058bef4a5b854b229cae9c408f SHA-1: e3b904abaa0bcaf32d5dd3c12403795c2c5e26b3 SHA-256: 053b4b634c121a85d5c6c01c612bed74e093e138a42b60c56d9b8eba9ce695ad
172 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains multiple links pointing to compromised WordPress sites, suggesting a link farm designed to host malicious content. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent. While no scripts were extracted, the presence of numerous external links, many hosted on potentially compromised CMS platforms, points towards a phishing or malware distribution scheme.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Urgency / deadline lure low SE_URGENCY_LURE
    Document contains urgency or deadline language ('account will be terminated', 'action required within 24 hours', etc.) — useful context, but low-signal without other findings
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://bjoybrands.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609674a478493---gudazexepuxu.pdf
    • https://artsketch.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/60c05c508d296c0f362232aacd0e3d55/12365391540.pdf
    • http://ar-intl.net/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5j2dlre38dc692jpqt1l9j9nd3/levogakaboke.pdf
    • https://www.formwork.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/o257o9t1bv5kp27g2gjfirv2d2/wapavuwujafuk.pdf
    • https://www.parkgest.ch/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607df589239c8---vikajula.pdf
    • http://www.empresasdelimpeza.info/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16076906f448d4---baguronetapijamugepa.pdf
    • https://alignerco.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/d143ada08344c33335de3d9e8a478aa6/33972280311.pdf
    • https://chocoinmobiliario.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/2b0fc681cab786d36973bc9ef04da116/nowoputixokemazowebavin.pdf
    • https://janeunchained.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/4aclp2c9ep1ugbbohv2nhgngot/32179127684.pdf
    • https://lakecountyoralsurgery.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16088f10152bae---73168046864.pdf
    • http://prodesign31.ru/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a2dd87f17fa---27128484185.pdf
    • https://amesmedicalservices.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160828acf21412---kefiralarosotanu.pdf
    • http://hzjksj.com/images/upload/File/jekesizovufuk.pdf
    • http://bagpack.com.np/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608569870acfd---loledolisefatusivawopugu.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/LPIa9PGmDLg/uplcv?utm_term=how+do+i+get+my+money+back+from+v+shred
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000cff1.bin
d2a881e170a5f7727a8a468d9d2e7d5378f2c71f626a4cb47fafb93ff42c8d9d
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xCFF1 5824 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000e3bd.bin
97821f378c3a54e8ca02c8f1808b16818371045c5794896680cbc2112192e155
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE3BD 10736 bytes