Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0511be2729e4e208…

MALICIOUS

PDF

47.4 KB Created: 2020-10-27 20:00:24 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-14
MD5: f0cd4f0f53787cd2bc18ab891b8fb9e1 SHA-1: eb228097fe61ea5da1224ed85a7ff4014bb18004 SHA-256: 0511be2729e4e208b40a7d2c865c3435421992cdfe5667ebf39f08a8fd86d9ac
184 Risk Score
Tags
free-cdn-ebook-manual-lure

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, with one identified as a malicious redirector. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains URLs that are also present in the heuristics, indicating a link farm designed to direct users to potentially harmful sites. The ML classifier strongly supports the malicious verdict.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.me/123?keyword=edgar+allan+poe+writing+style In PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366646/normal_5f9070f1cae59.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4369152/normal_5f964b1207ad8.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4368235/normal_5f8c7a44c9135.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366958/normal_5f8bb57c2acc9.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4411491/normal_5f9602332c7d9.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://firerokuk.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131164187/kepenu-likilaxi-wanerojitofetaw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xumogimunosu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131607683/0178282ef9a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://riragojefo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131857115/difegazixar_dexugavojodewod.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gukepofefefika.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437977/donazumeta_kaxowanebubuk_likomitide.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zoxuzuxebexot.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969059/vanojiraxajerubefiza.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nefenupenarus.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134476068/vunutu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/e7a41d35-a852-4a44-8b38-88d38c513e56/paroxebuv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/27443c85-d604-4fb7-abb0-ebbb46fb44eb/88610635118.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/f86090c7-ac23-49c6-9f5e-048bdd26c2fe/xitolazafim.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0492/4565/1110/files/sonic_cd_mods_apk.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0480/9578/9220/files/98590504220.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006e0a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6E0A 5064 bytes
SHA-256: 4d3a2e6dd9a753d32374e144115dbab3b9ba0e6067ca68106ecac6485e36745a
font_01_sfnt_off00007f5f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7F5F 10456 bytes
SHA-256: 254e78f36c720dd4bed0f3b38f45cfa22a1554c583e715322654d33ae2587d03
font_02_sfnt_off0000a2b3.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xA2B3 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 0d0f64e27578eb124b8bc81c7eceacdd166e22eddd95c81328e9fbd7de2a6333

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