Ursnif — Office (OOXML) / .DOC malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 04fdb0fdc76d11ad…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

50.5 KB Created: 2021-06-28 10:39:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: b736f5dc071bb3d2bb3f4f9e2e0155d1 SHA-1: c0389238fb0fe2a02fc9ac8d6cb25003e013a7e6 SHA-256: 04fdb0fdc76d11adab9864aa36d4b54e40823ff00373b236808e47b8465a626e
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Ursnif · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains a VBA macro with a Document_Open auto-execution subroutine. This subroutine calls a function that uses Shell() to execute 'cmd /c' with a path to a file named 'objectVarQuery.h', likely to download and execute a second-stage payload. The ClamAV detection name 'Doc.Downloader.Ursnif' strongly suggests the Ursnif family.

Heuristics 7

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Ursnif06210-9875010-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Ursnif06210-9875010-0
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • cmd.exe reference in VBA high OLE_VBA_CMD
    cmd.exe reference in VBA
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/tiff/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/exif/1.0/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
46f3621c587494ead00b5f6a228d3894f4c61d156f5bae18cc183892b511bb8e		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1381 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
8203cb666e338c11c22a0ecd1789779c3c159a15fb05df6c0ff225857280ca40		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 17408 bytes

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