Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 04f73a0e5533776d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

114.6 KB Created: 2020-11-03 19:27:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 6c43931c2d36e47201fe7f942c99dac9 SHA-1: 6fe403b8b288e0106f54585fc4009579a2af5bb5 SHA-256: 04f73a0e5533776db17119a116b081c31b6587eabecc35a6b192e9d908121d48
290 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1218.011 System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32

The sample is a malicious OOXML document containing a VBA macro with an AutoOpen subroutine. This macro utilizes the Shell() function and references a LOLBin, indicating an attempt to execute arbitrary code. The presence of the 'Doc.Downloader' ClamAV signature further supports its role as a downloader. The VBA code is heavily obfuscated with numerous comments and meaningless variable names, making it difficult to determine the exact payload or destination URL.

Heuristics 8

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • LOLBin reference in VBA critical OLE_VBA_LOLBIN
    LOLBin reference in VBA
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.87e88716f38ff820-OOXML-9981520-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.87e88716f38ff820-OOXML-9981520-0
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
494522b8a2ef2f6bf6bec05140bc92b83a7992838427e59ce66b65158a8124f6		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 9633 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
d50e44f6fd936964419a8801cb8ec9295cb0e117a67992626a10e870a6814995		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 43520 bytes

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