Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 04c65017a3bfa35e…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

117.2 KB Created: 2006-01-25 08:30:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: 433b8fefec5ef9da0ec3106d6a0c257d SHA-1: bacac018d6a78c0d7d99080035ffae4a58a0e6f9 SHA-256: 04c65017a3bfa35e820793419ff1d3cbad54550125424ae4c2e565f7db66e114
260 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The sample exhibits high-confidence heuristics indicating the use of WinExec, CreateProcess, LoadLibrary, and GetProcAddress APIs, alongside a suspicious invocation of cmd.exe. The OLE slack anomaly suggests potential obfuscation or embedded malicious content. These indicators point towards an attempt to execute arbitrary code, likely to download and run a second-stage payload, but no specific family could be identified.

Heuristics 7

  • Reference to WinExec API high SC_STR_WINEXEC
    Reference to WinExec API
  • Reference to CreateProcess API high SC_STR_CREATEPROCESS
    Reference to CreateProcess API
  • Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag high SC_STR_CMD
    Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 119,968 bytes but its declared streams total only 21,151 bytes — 98,817 bytes (82%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOC
    Reference to VirtualAlloc API