Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 04982c9ce9e97fa4…

MALICIOUS

RTF

152.1 KB First seen: 2019-09-30
MD5: 0eab9d872fd631beaea2927d4140d593 SHA-1: cd5a1eb4ddf97fdb4c3213cb32863e1db9b16f6f SHA-256: 04982c9ce9e97fa4f56e2bfbd437a8dd55b020f67eae51f0e06d2d14dbe052c3
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF document containing OLE object data and specifically targets the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of \objupdate indicates an attempt to force OLE activation, likely to trigger the exploit. This suggests the document's primary purpose is to execute arbitrary code via the Equation Editor vulnerability, leading to a second-stage payload download.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000c8d.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xC8D 55002 bytes
SHA-256: 5b6d46f4f8551576a81789e9b00d7f8bb60e02b5ef200eae900b33feaf7fa977