Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 047cf01946d338db…

MALICIOUS

RTF

39.4 KB First seen: 2023-07-18
MD5: 0e68879d73734af241629e88e1321463 SHA-1: 347fa7e023d0e2af560fbe39679ab4857352469d SHA-256: 047cf01946d338dbb132a5564269002b6aba1b0b2bf26b3199503b7d293712f6
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, a known exploit vector. The ".objupdate" directive indicates that the object will be activated automatically upon opening, bypassing user interaction. The document body contains a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing' to view the content, which is a common tactic for macro-based malware droppers.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00005495.bin
389c7056bbb47c2f5aed337b0fe3d2f0e6b416125e9a63221537f3e8884b01fd
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x5495 1407 bytes