Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0479439b25747015…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.8 KB
MD5: 68fe0bd120a18d2a247f3322e948463b SHA-1: 85b6476f4063e62f22a1a3da2229f7b40d9f6912 SHA-256: 0479439b257470151391a12e00899084a9455b750fd87ef44f3d68daa2c8a6f6
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF document containing OLE objects and specifically triggers heuristics for the Equation Editor vulnerability. This indicates it's designed to exploit a client-side vulnerability to achieve code execution upon opening. The presence of OLE objects and the specific Equation Editor exploit pattern strongly suggest a malicious document intended for delivery via spearphishing.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000b4.bin
7b9588870bde2644a8e40349dda6abafc9dfa8140fd666cb29e2fd7491792eb2
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xB4 1693 bytes