Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 04714ec4a9cfa030…

MALICIOUS

RTF

78.2 KB First seen: 2024-07-29
MD5: 7279ab0fbc0a02d8b6966ed3cdf67aca SHA-1: 4a6bef6dba00cc872e10b66b00786ace03e6443a SHA-256: 04714ec4a9cfa0304d2de5012ae1081850d2a2b080ad68831ba2c8385bda4d01
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The ".objupdate" directive indicates that the embedded object will be activated automatically upon opening the document. This is a common technique for exploiting the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882) to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000a72.bin
07dfda6b5f1a522e223f7c0f8992e3cf90d2fcbbbb8b768a528150cdb0da96b6
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xA72 1707 bytes